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Executive Summary
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT is alarmingly low.
While numerous factors contribute to this phenomenon, one of the most potent is the widespread
belief that government has been taken over by powerful special interests. Such a belief is not unfound-
ed. Special interests—which these days mainly mean large corporations and their trade associations—
spend huge sums on campaign contributions and lobbying. 
Yet money is not the only way business exercises its influence; it also relies on the movement of cer-
tain people into and out of key policymaking posts in the executive and legislative branches. This
movement, known as the revolving door, increases the likelihood that those making policies are sym-
pathetic to the needs of business—either because they come from that world or they plan to move to
the private sector after finishing a stint with government.
The revolving door is not new, but it seems to have become much more common. Recent adminis-
trations have appointed unprecedented numbers of key officials from the ranks of corporate execu-
tives and business lobbyists. At the same time, record numbers of members of Congress are becoming
corporate lobbyists after they leave office, and it has become routine for top executive-branch offi-
cials to leave government and go to work for companies they used to regulate. As more and more offi-
cials are making policies affecting companies for which they used to work or will soon do so, actual
and potential conflicts of interest are proliferating.
It is to address this problem that the Revolving Door Working Group was created and that this report
was written. Our aim is twofold: to educate the public about the workings of the revolving door and
the inadequacies of the current regulatory framework that governs it; and to propose a set of new
measures to strengthen that framework.
This report first sets out to fill the need for a systematic overview of the various forms of the revolv-
ing door. These include: 
n THE INDUSTRY-TO-GOVERNMENT REVOLVING DOOR, through which the appointment of
corporate executives and business lobbyists to key posts in federal agencies establishes a pro-
business bias in policy formulation and regulatory enforcement. We give some historical
background on this practice (sometimes known as the “reverse revolving door”) and then
detail the growing extent to which it has occurred in recent years in agencies such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environment Protection Agency and
the Departments of Agriculture, Energy and Defense. 
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n THE GOVERNMENT-TO-INDUSTRY REVOLVING DOOR, through which public officials
move to lucrative private-sector positions in which they may use their government experience
to unfairly benefit their new employer in matters of federal procurement and regulatory pol-
icy. We include brief profiles of some of the most egregious cases of recent years, including
that of Darleen Druyun, who was found guilty of manipulating Defense Department pro-
curement decisions to benefit Boeing while she was negotiating a job with the company. 
n THE GOVERNMENT-TO-LOBBYIST REVOLVING DOOR, through which former lawmakers
and executive-branch officials become well-paid advocates and use their inside connections to
advance the interests of corporate clients. We look at the statistics on the rush to K Street
while also profiling some brazen examples, such as Rep. James Greenwood, who apparently
lost interest in a planned investigation of the pharmaceutical industry after he received an
offer to head the leading biotechnology trade association. 
This paper argues that there are at least six important reasons why the public should pay more atten-
tion to the revolving door:
n It can provide a vehicle for public servants to use their office for personal or private gain at
the expense of the American taxpayer;
n The revolving door casts grave doubts on the integrity of official actions and legislation. A
Member of Congress or a government employee could well be influenced in his or her offi-
cial actions by promises of a future high-paying job from a business that has a pecuniary inter-
est in the official’s actions while in government. Even if the official is not unduly influenced
by promises of future employment, the appearance of undue influence itself casts aspersions
on the integrity of the federal government;
n It can provide some government contractors with unfair advantages over their competitors,
due to insider knowledge that can be used to the benefit of the contractor, and potentially to
the detriment of the public interest; 
n The former employee may have privileged access to government officials. Tapping into a
closed network friends and colleagues built while in office, a government employee-turned-
lobbyist may well have access to power brokers not available to others. In some cases, these
networks could involve prior obligations and favors. Former Members of Congress even
retain privileged access to the Congressional gym, dining hall and floors of Congress.
n It has resulted in a highly complex but ultimately ineffective framework of ethics and con-
flict-of-interest regulations. Enforcing those regulations has become a virtual industry within
the government, costing significant resources but rarely resulting in sanctions or convictions
of those accused of violating the rules. As a result, ethics rules offer little or no deterrent to
those who might violate the public trust; and
n The appearance of impropriety exacerbates public distrust in government, ultimately causing
a decline in civic participation. It also demoralizes honest government workers who do not
use their government jobs as a stepping stone to lucrative employment government contrac-
tors or lobbying firms. 
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After describing the various types of revolving-door conflicts of interest and pointing out the weak-
nesses in the existing rules framework, the paper proposes a set of policy reforms. These remedies seek
to enhance transparency, increase vigilance, and establish mechanisms to reduce impropriety
(whether perceived or actual) by establishing appropriate boundaries between public service and the
pursuit of private interests. Among the specific proposals are:
n consolidation of ethics oversight entities in the executive branch and in Congress;
n granting the consolidated entities greater oversight and enforcement powers;
n standardization of conflict-of-interest rules throughout the federal government;
n adoption of procedures that would allow the Office of Government Ethics to rule a person
ineligible for a certain post if that person’s employment background would tend to create fre-
quent conflicts with the rule requiring impartiality on the part of federal employees;
n strengthening of recusal rules that bar appointees from handling matters involving their for-
mer employers in the private sector, including mandatory recusal on matters directly involv-
ing one’s employers and clients during the 24-month period prior to taking office;
n monitoring of recusal agreements by the Office of Government Ethics;
n prohibiting, for a period of time, senior officials from seeking employment with contractors
that may have significantly benefited from policies formulated by those officials;
n restricting the granting of waivers that allow public officials to negotiate future employment
in the private sector while still in office;
n extending the period during which officials cannot engage in lobbying after leaving office and
expanding the scope of prohibited activities; 
n requiring federal officials to enter into a binding ethics “exit plan” when leaving the public
sector to clarify what activities will be prohibited;
n revoking the special privileges granted to former members of Congress while they are serving
as lobbyists; and 
n improving the reporting and disclosure of recusal agreements, waivers, lobbyist reports and
other ethics filings.
The paper’s recommendations do not seek to disqualify all private-sector veterans from government
service, nor do we suggest that federal officials be completely barred from moving to the business
world. Yet there is clearly a need to strengthen the existing regulatory framework covering revolving-
door activity and to tighten its enforcement. Doing so will go a long way toward restoring integrity
to the federal government. 
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Introduction:
The Revolving Door and Industry
Influence On Public Policy
by PETER O’DRISCOLL, Center of Concern & SCOTT AMEY, Project On
Government Oversight
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT is alarmingly low,
which raises fundamental questions about the effectiveness of our democratic process. According to
a CBS News/New York Times poll in July 2004, 56 percent of the American people trust the govern-
ment to do what is right only some of the time.1 While many factors contribute to this mistrust, the
same poll found that 64 percent of respondents believe “government is pretty much run by a few big
interests looking out for themselves.” Public concerns about corporate influence on public policy pre-
date the parade of accounting scandals that have brought down huge companies over the past four
years. In September 2000, well before the Enron case broke, Business Week reported that nearly three
quarters of the American people believed that corporations had too much control over their lives.2
These survey results strongly suggest that the success of efforts to restore public trust in government
will hinge on reducing the disproportionate degree to which the private sector (also referenced in this
paper as “corporations,” “business,” “industry” or “trade associations”) is able to influence the for-
mulation and implementation of public policy. To this point, debate about breaking the grip of “spe-
cial interests” on government has focused mostly on the corrosive influence of money on politics,
leading to legislation to reform campaign finance. Yet, important as campaign contributions have
been in increasing corporate influence on policy, it is now time to address other ways in which com-
panies promote their own interests at the expense of the common good.
This paper explores various forms of a key mechanism by which corporate interests influence feder-
al decision-making, especially with regard to regulatory policy and procurement choices. The mech-
anism is the revolving door—the movement of individuals back and forth between the private sector
and the public sector. The revolving door takes three forms: 
THE INDUSTRY-TO-GOVERNMENT REVOLVING DOOR, through which the appointment of
corporate executives and business lobbyists to key posts in federal agencies establishes a pro-
business bias in policy formulation and regulatory enforcement;
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THE GOVERNMENT-TO-INDUSTRY REVOLVING
DOOR, through which public officials move to lucrative
private sector positions in which they may use their gov-
ernment experience and contacts to unfairly benefit their
new employer in matters of federal procurement and
regulatory policy; and 
THE GOVERNMENT-TO-LOBBYIST REVOLVING DOOR,
through which former lawmakers and executive-branch
officials become well-paid advocates and use their inside
connections to advance the interests of corporate clients. 
All three forms of revolving-door industry access have become so
common in recent years that it is often hard to determine where
government ends and the private sector begins. This was illus-
trated several months ago in the case of Philip A. Cooney, a for-
mer lawyer and lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute
who went to work for the George W. Bush Administration. First,
there was an uproar over the revelation that, while serving as chief
of staff of the White House Council on Environmental Quality,
Cooney repeatedly revised government scientific reports to
obscure the connection between greenhouse-gas emissions and
global warming. Cooney soon resigned from the federal govern-
ment. It came as no surprise that his next position was with
Exxon Mobil. This prompted the New York Times to editorialize
that “it is surely a cause for dismay that the Bush administration
has seen fit to embed so many former lobbyists in key policy or
regulatory jobs where they can carry out their industry’s agenda
from within.”3
This paper argues that there are at least six important reasons why the public should pay more atten-
tion to the revolving door:
n It can provide a vehicle for public servants to use their office for personal or private gain at
the expense of the American taxpayer;
n The revolving door casts grave doubts on the integrity of official actions and legislation. A
Member of Congress or a government employee could well be influenced in his or her offi-
cial actions by promises of a future high-paying job from a business that has a pecuniary inter-
est in the official’s actions while in government. Even if the official is not unduly influenced
by promises of future employment, the appearance of undue influence itself casts aspersions
on the integrity of the federal government;
n It can provide some government contractors with unfair advantages over their competitors,
due to insider knowledge that can be used to the benefit of the contractor, and potentially to
the detriment of the public interest;4
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According to a CBS News/New
York Times poll in July 2004, 56
percent of the American people
trust the government to do what is
right only some of the time. While
many factors contribute to this
mistrust, the same poll found that
64 percent of respondents believe
"government is pretty much run by
a few big interests looking out for
themselves." 
n The former employee may have privileged access to government officials. Tapping into a
closed network of friends and colleagues established while serving in office, a government
employee-turned-lobbyist may well have access to power-brokers not available to others. In
some cases, these networks could involve prior obligations and favors. Former Members of
Congress even retain privileged access to the Congressional gym, dining hall and floors of
Congress.
n It has resulted in a highly complex but ultimately ineffective framework of ethics and con-
flict-of-interest regulations. Enforcing those regulations has become a virtual industry within
the government, costing significant resources but rarely resulting in sanctions or convictions
of those accused of violating the rules. As a result, ethics rules offer little or no deterrent to
those who might violate the public trust; and
n The appearance of impropriety exacerbates public distrust in government, ultimately causing
a decline in civic participation. It also demoralizes honest government workers who do not
use their government jobs as a stepping stone to lucrative employment with government con-
tractors or lobbying firms. 
After describing the various types of revolving-door conflicts of interest and pointing out the weak-
nesses in the existing rules framework, the paper proposes a set of policy reforms. These remedies seek
to enhance transparency, increase vigilance and establish mechanisms to reduce impropriety (whether
perceived or actual) by establishing appropriate boundaries between public service and the pursuit of
private interests. Among the specific proposals are:
n consolidation of ethics oversight entities in the executive branch and in Congress;
n granting the consolidated entities greater oversight and enforcement powers;
n standardization of conflict-of-interest rules throughout the federal government;
n adoption of procedures that would allow the Office of Government Ethics to rule a person
ineligible for a certain post if that person’s employment background would tend to create fre-
quent conflicts with the rule requiring impartiality on the part of federal employees;
n strengthening of recusal rules that bar appointees from handling matters involving their for-
mer employers in the private sector, including mandatory recusal on matters directly involv-
ing one’s employers and clients during the 24-month period prior to taking office;
n monitoring of recusal agreements by the Office of Government Ethics;
n prohibiting, for a period of time, senior officials from seeking employment with contractors
that may have significantly benefited from policies formulated by those officials;
n restricting the granting of waivers that allow public officials to negotiate future employment
in the private sector while still in office;
n extending the period during which officials cannot engage in lobbying after leaving office and
expanding the scope of prohibited activities;
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n requiring federal officials to enter into a binding ethics
“exit plan” when leaving the public sector to clarify what
activities will be prohibited;
n revoking the special privileges granted to former members
of Congress while they are serving as lobbyists; and 
n improving the reporting and disclosure of recusal agree-
ments, waivers, lobbyist reports and other ethics filings.
The paper’s recommendations do not seek to disqualify all private
sector veterans from government service, nor do we suggest that
federal officials be completely barred from moving to the business
world. Yet there is a need to strengthen the existing regulatory
framework covering revolving-door activity and to tighten its
enforcement. 
Given the strength of industry lobby groups and the continued
influence of money on policy formulation, it will take great politi-
cal courage for lawmakers and policymakers to follow the recom-
mendations proposed in this paper. Those who champion
public-interest reforms will risk losing access to corporate money.
Over the coming months, the Revolving Door Working Group will
be calling on legislators and the executive branch to implement the
measures proposed below. The Group’s hope is that legislators and
policymakers will recognize that the revitalization of public trust in
elected, appointed, or career officials and the integrity of govern-
ment are cornerstones upon which the maintenance of our demo-
cratic system depend. For that reason, now is the time to set aside
personal and political calculations, and to act instead in the best
interests of citizens, taxpayers and the country itself.
NOTE: The inclusion of specific names of individuals in this report is by no means an implicit allegation
of illegal behavior on their part (except in those instances, which are noted, where guilt has been deter-
mined by legal proceedings). We believe, however, that these examples illustrate the extent to which there
are at least potential conflicts of interest throughout the federal government. The aim of the Revolving Door
Working Group is to make such conflicts rarities rather than the norm. 
13INTRODUCTION
This prompted the New York
Times to editorialize that "it is
surely a cause for dismay that
the Bush administration has
seen fit to embed so many
former lobbyists in key policy
or regulatory jobs where they
can carry out their industry's
agenda from within." 
Chapter 1:
The Industry-to-Government
Revolving Door
How the appointment of industry veterans to key posts in 
federal agencies tends to create a pro-business bias in policy
formulation and regulatory enforcement.
by PHILIP MATTERA, Corporate Research Project
THE REVOLVING DOOR—the movement of individuals back and forth between positions in the pri-
vate sector and in the federal government—takes a variety of forms. We begin with the practice of
appointing corporate executives and business lobbyists to positions in the executive branch, where they
may be inclined to mold federal policy in ways that benefit their former (and probably future) employ-
ers in the private sector. This phenomenon, which has not been widely studied, is usually called the
reverse revolving door5 to distinguish it from the more extensively analyzed movement of individuals
from the executive branch and Congress into the private sector (addressed in Chapters 2 and 3). 
The reverse revolving door raises serious concerns about excessive business influence over broad fed-
eral policymaking, especially in Cabinet departments and independent regulatory agencies responsi-
ble for corporate oversight. When a federal official is looking forward to a new position in the private
sector, he or she may manipulate a contract or regulatory process to benefit a specific future employ-
er. By contrast, a corporate executive or lobbyist joining the government might not only tend to favor
a previous private-sector employer but might also be ideologically inclined to shape policy to benefit
business in general, as opposed to the broader public interest. This is why the scant literature that
does exist on the reverse revolving door is not primarily concerned with matters of individual con-
flicts of interest or ethics. Instead, the issue tends to be seen in terms of business influence over pub-
lic policy. 6
From another perspective, of course, the presence of business veterans in government posts is viewed
as a reasonable outcome of the public sector’s need to recruit individuals with relevant knowledge and
real-world experience. Defenders of the reverse revolving door argue that it would be impossible to
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staff specialized agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission if everyone who had worked
for industry were disqualified. That may be so for certain technical jobs, but our concern is with high-
level policymaking positions for which business experience is not necessarily a prerequisite. 
This paper acknowledges that it may not be feasible to ban all appoint-
ments of businesspeople to executive branch posts, but it does raise two
important concerns. The first is that the current preponderance of indus-
try veterans (to the exclusion of other qualified candidates) in key posi-
tions is giving overall regulatory policy too much of a pro-business tilt.
The second is that existing ethics rules (described in the Regulation sec-
tion below) are not strong enough to guard against conflicts of interest
that may arise when individual federal officials make policy that affects
their former private-sector employers. 
To set the stage for discussion, this chapter begins with some historical
background on the reverse revolving door and an examination of its use
during the current administration. This is followed by a review of the lim-
ited regulations currently on the books and by analysis of how those rules
may be strengthened. 
Historical Background
Business and commercial interests have exercised substantial influence over the federal government
since the beginning of the Republic. The Founding Fathers, after all, were generally of the propertied
class. While the top elected positions in the country—the Presidency and Vice Presidency—have
been filled by individuals whose professional background tended to be more in the public than in the
private sector, those officials have not hesitated, especially in the past hundred years, to appoint indi-
viduals with experience in the business world to various key positions in the executive branch. This
practice can be traced most easily by looking at the history of Presidential Cabinets. 
Examples of Cabinet appointments from the world of big business date back to the late 19th
Century. In 1897, for instance, President McKinley named Lyman Gage, an executive of the First
National Bank of Chicago, to be Secretary of the Treasury. Two decades later, that same position was
given by President Harding to wealthy financier Andrew Mellon. He held the post for more than a
decade (serving during the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations as well) and used the position to
promote reductions in taxes on business. 
Over the past 50 years, the Treasury Secretary has continued to be a post frequently awarded to mem-
bers of the financial and corporate elite, during both Democratic and Republican administrations.
Eisenhower, for example, gave the post to George Humphrey of the steel company M.A. Hanna.
Kennedy chose C. Douglas Dillon, who had been with the Wall Street firm Dillon, Read. Reagan’s
first Treasury Secretary was Donald Regan, head of Merrill Lynch. More recently, George W. Bush
twice turned to the corporate sector, first choosing Paul O’Neill of Alcoa and later replacing him with
the current Treasury Secretary, John Snow, former chief executive of the railroad company CSX. 
15CHAPTER 1
A corporate executive or
lobbyist joining the
government might not
only tend to favor a
previous private-sector
employer but might also
be ideologically inclined
to shape policy to
benefit business in
general, as opposed to
the broader public
interest. 
In keeping with the notion of a “military-industrial complex,” the position of Secretary of Defense is
another top Cabinet post that has often been filled by corporate nominees rather than career military
candidates. Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense was Charles E. Wilson, the former General Motors
president who in his confirmation hearing famously said: “For years I thought what was good for our
country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist.” Kennedy’s choice
for the Defense post was Robert McNamara, who had just been named president of the Ford Motor
Co. Reagan’s first Defense Secretary was Caspar Weinberger, who had joined the engineering giant
Bechtel Corp. a few years earlier after a career in the public sector. Clinton’s second Defense Secretary,
William Perry, had served as managing director of investment banking firm Hambrecht & Quist in
addition to holding posts in the Pentagon. The current Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, also had
spent time in the corporate sector—including stints as chief executive of G.D. Searle and later
General Instrument—in addition to his work in previous administrations.
Among other Cabinet positions, the one that has probably been filled most frequently with a busi-
ness person is, of course, Secretary of Commerce. The latest occupant of that post, Carlos Gutierrez,
was previously chief executive of cereal giant Kellogg Co.
Looking at Cabinets as a whole, it was during the Reagan Administration that the overall business
presence first became quite pronounced. In addition to Regan and Weinberger, the corporate veter-
ans in Reagan’s Cabinet included Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who had become president of
United Technologies after his military career. After Haig resigned in 1982, Reagan replaced him with
George Shultz, who had headed Bechtel Corp. during the 1970s after two decades as an academic
and federal official. Attorney General William French Smith had represented corporate clients at a
major Los Angeles law firm. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge had been chairman of Scovill
Inc. Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis had been a management consultant as well as a major
investor in real estate and energy properties. Even the Secretary of Labor, Raymond Donovan, had a
business background as an executive of a New Jersey construction company. 
The Reagan Administration’s recruitment of corporate figures was not limited to the Cabinet level.
Key sub-Cabinet positions also went to business veterans.7 For example, W. Kenneth Davis, who had
been an executive at Bechtel, was named Deputy Secretary of Energy. Deputy Agriculture Secretary
Richard Lyng had been president of the American Meat Institute trade association, and C.W.
McMillan, USDA’s Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Inspection Services, had previously been
employed as an executive of the National Cattlemen’s Association, a beef industry trade group and a
precursor to today’s National Cattlemen’s Beef Association. 
Reagan also put people from the business world in charge of the independent agencies specifically
charged to regulate business.8 The pattern was so clear that, in March 1981, investigative reporter Jeff
Gerth of the New York Times published a piece headlined “Is Business Regulation Now in Friendly
Hands?”9 Gerth noted examples such as John Shad, vice chairman of brokerage house E.F. Hutton,
who was named chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; Richard Pratt, a lobbyist for
the thrift industry, who was named to head the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; Mark Fowler, a cor-
porate lawyer representing broadcasting companies, who was named to head the Federal
Communications Commission; and Philip Johnson, a corporate lawyer whose clients included the
Chicago Board of Trade, who was named to head the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
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Appointments such as these set the stage for the Reagan
Administration’s campaign to weaken federal regulation of business.
It must be said, however, that this campaign was also advanced by
officials who did not come directly from the business world, includ-
ing Environmental Protection Agency administrator Anne
Gorsuch, who had previously been a state legislator in Colorado. 
During the George H.W. Bush Administration, the presence of
business figures in key regulatory positions was less pronounced.
Efforts to weaken regulation were led by Vice President Quayle
(who at one time was an executive of his family’s publishing com-
pany). Quayle used an entity called the White House Council on
Competitiveness to spearhead the campaign. In 1991 the
Council’s executive director, Allan Hubbard, was accused of a
conflict of interest because of his financial holdings in corpora-
tions that stood to benefit from a deregulatory agenda. One of
those companies was an Indiana chemical producer of which
Hubbard was a half-owner. 10
The Clinton Administration took a less antagonistic approach to
regulation, and the people it appointed to key positions, including
the heads of OSHA and the EPA, mostly had a public sector back-
ground. The person named to the top EPA post, Carol Browner,
also had experience working for a public-interest organization. 
Yet Clinton’s White House and Cabinet were not free from
reverse-revolving-door appointments. The first chief of staff,
Thomas McLarty, had been an executive with a natural-gas com-
pany in Arkansas. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown had been
a lobbyist with a firm that represented many corporate clients, as
did the law firm where U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor worked. Robert Rubin of Goldman
Sachs was named economic advisor, and Roger Altman of the investment firm Blackstone Group was
chosen to be Deputy Treasury Secretary. In 1995 Rubin took over as Treasury Secretary and contin-
ued to promote economic policies seen by many as overly favorable to the bond market. Veterans
Affairs Secretary Togo West had worked for Northrop Corporation, and Clinton’s last Commerce
Secretary, Norman Mineta, had worked for Lockheed Martin.
Bush II: Business Veterans Reach New Levels of Dominance
The practice of reverse-revolving-door appointments has become more frequent during the George
W. Bush Administration. The elevation of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney to the two highest posts
in the land could itself be seen as a significant case of the reverse revolving door. Bush, after all, spent
much of his career as a businessman in the oil & gas industry and then as a part-owner of the Texas
Rangers baseball team. He had an M.B.A., to boot. Bush had not risen to great heights in the cor-
porate world before running for governor of Texas, but he had clearly been shaped by that world. 
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Eisenhower's Secretary of
Defense was Charles E.
Wilson, the former General
Motors president who in his
confirmation hearing famously
said: "For years I thought what
was good for our country was
good for General Motors, and
vice versa. The difference did
not exist." 
Cheney, of course, had spent five years as the chief executive of
the controversial Halliburton Co. before being chosen as Bush’s
running mate in 2000. Before that he had held positions with the
Nixon and Ford administrations, had represented Wyoming in
the House (during which time he was an aggressive advocate of
business interests) and had served as the first President Bush’s
Secretary of Defense. Cheney continued to receive deferred com-
pensation from Halliburton after taking office as Vice President. 
It thus came as no surprise that the Bush-Cheney Administration
came to be populated by many business veterans. Bush chose as
his chief of staff Andrew Card, who had been a vice president of
General Motors and a lobbyist for the auto industry (as well as the
first President Bush’s Transportation Secretary). In addition to
selecting Alcoa CEO Paul O’Neill to head Treasury and one-time
corporate executive Donald Rumsfeld to run Defense, Bush chose
oil & gas executive Donald Evans as Secretary of Commerce and
Anthony Principi, an executive with a medical services company,
to be Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao
had been employed by several large banks in addition to her work
in the public sector. National Security Advisor (and now Secretary
of State) Condoleezza Rice was not a corporate executive but she
was on the boards of Chevron (which had named an oil tanker
after her) and Charles Schwab. 
The same pattern of appointments began to emerge in key regu-
latory spots. Harvey Pitt, a corporate lawyer with close ties to the
securities industry, was named chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. J. Howard Beales III, an economist who
served as a consultant to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco when its adver-
tising practices were being scrutinized, was appointed the con-
sumer-protection chief of the Federal Trade Commission. Bush
chose as his regulation czar (i.e., head of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs) John Graham, an academic whose think
tank, the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, has received generous
contributions from blue-chip corporations and industry groups
because of its critical approach to regulatory policy. 
Almost exactly twenty years after the Jeff Gerth article cited above, the New York Times published a
similar piece by Katharine Seelye titled “Bush is Choosing Industry Insiders to Fill Several
Environmental Positions.”11 This would prove to be the first of several articles and reports issued dur-
ing the remainder of George W. Bush’s first term highlighting business influence over regulatory
process brought about, in part, by the reverse revolving door—or what an analysis by the Center for
American Progress and OMB Watch labeled “Foxes in the Henhouse.”12
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The elevation of George W.
Bush and Dick Cheney to the
two highest posts in the land
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revolving door...Bush had not
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that world. Cheney had spent
five years as the chief
executive of the controversial
Halliburton Co. before being
chosen as Bush's running
mate in 2000
On Valentine’s Day 2003, Rep. George Miller of California issued a report called A Sweetheart Deal:
How the Republicans have Turned the Government Over to Special Interests. “In case after case,” the
report stated, “the former lobbyists who work at the Bush Administration continue to court their
friends and former employers while jilting the interests of the public.”13 A May 2004 investigation by
the Denver Post found more than 100 examples of high-level officials in the Bush Administration who
were involved in regulating industries they formerly represented as lobbyists, lawyers or company
advocates.14
Some of the more egregious examples of this phenomenon are the following:
n DAVID LAURISKI, chosen as the Labor Department’s Assistant Secretary of Mine Safety and
Health, previously spent 30 years in the mining industry, during which time he advocated
loosening of coal dust standards. Once in office, he issued controversial rules (later blocked
by the Senate) that would have reduced coal-dust testing in mines.15 Lauriski resigned from
his position in late 2004 and took a job with a mine-industry consulting company. 16 The
Charleston Gazette later reported that Lauriski had been negotiating for private-sector jobs as
early as six months before leaving office.17
n J. STEVEN GRILES, named Deputy Secretary of the Interior, was previously a lobbyist for
major oil and mining companies and for the National Mining Association. Although Griles
signed a recusal agreement in 2001, he reportedly continued to be involved in controversial
issues involving former clients such as Yates Petroleum. An Interior Department Inspector
General’s report cleared Griles of formal ethical violations but suggested that he was operat-
ing in an “ethical quagmire.”18 Griles submitted his resignation in December 2004 and later
formed a lobbying firm together with former U.S. Representative George Nethercutt and for-
mer White House energy advisor Andrew Lundquist.19
n JACQUELINE GLASSMAN, appointed chief counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, previously worked in the general counsel’s office of DaimlerChrysler, where
among other things she helped defend against charges brought by California officials that the
company had recycled defective cars to consumers. At NHTSA she played a key role in the
decision to block disclosure of “early warning” information such as detailed model-specific
crash data.20 In 2005 she was named deputy administrator of the agency. 21
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A Closer Look at the Reverse Revolving Door in Five Federal Agencies
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
During the George W. Bush Administration, so many industry people moved into key policymaking
positions that an agency once known as the “People’s Department” could now better be considered
“USDA Inc.”22 Reverse-revolving-door appointments extended as high as Secretary Ann Veneman
(since replaced), whose prior career was generally in the public sector but who also once served on
the board of biotech company Calgene. Here are other examples of key appointees with industry ties
(though some, like Veneman, are no longer in office): 
n Secretary Veneman’s chief of staff Dale Moore had been executive director for legislative
affairs of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), a trade association heavily sup-
ported by and aligned with the interests of the big meatpacking companies. 
n Veneman’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Michael Torrey, had been a vice president at the
International Dairy Foods Association. 
n Director of Communications Alisa Harrison was formerly executive director of public rela-
tions at NCBA. 
n Deputy Secretary James Moseley was a partner in Infinity Pork LLC, a factory farm in
Indiana.
n Under Secretary J.B. Penn had been an executive of Sparks Companies, an agribusiness con-
sulting firm.
n Under Secretary Joseph Jen had been director of research at Campbell Soup Company’s
Campbell Institute of Research and Technology.
n Under Secretary for Natural Resources and the Environment Mark Rey, whose post involved
oversight of the Forest Service, was previously a vice president of the American Forest and
Paper Association.
n Deputy Under Secretary Floyd D. Gaibler had been executive director of the National Cheese
Institute and the American Butter Institute, which are funded by the dairy industry.
n Deputy Under Secretary Kate Coler had been director of government relations for the Food
Marketing Institute.
n Deputy Under Secretary Charles Lambert had spent 15 years working for NCBA. 
n Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Mary Waters had been a senior director and
legislative counsel for ConAgra Foods. 
Veneman’s successor, Mike Johanns, retained Dale Moore as his chief of staff and made Beth Johnson,
a former staffer at NCBA, one of Moore’s deputies. The post of Deputy Secretary was given to
Charles F. Conner, former president of the Corn Refiners Association.23
The widespread presence of meat industry veterans has undoubt-
edly played in role in the business-friendly/anti-consumer policies
followed by the Department on issues such as “mad cow disease”
testing, sanitation standards in slaughterhouses and regulation of
factory farms. The Clinton Administration’s record on food safe-
ty was hardly flawless, but the adherence to industry positions on
these matters became much more egregious under Bush. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
In the first George W. Bush Administration, the Energy
Department was a leading proponent of the industry-friendly
energy policy that had been formulated in 2001 by Vice President
Cheney in secret meetings with business representatives.
Although the Department was led by a former U.S. Senator,
Spencer Abraham, it had its share of industry veterans on staff.
These included:
n FRANCIS S. BLAKE, the Bush Administration’s initial
choice for Deputy Secretary of Energy, had been serving
as senior vice president of corporate business development
at General Electric. He played a key role in formulating
the administration’s controversial Clear Skies pollution
initiative.24 He left the federal government a year later and
returned to the private sector as an executive at Home
Depot.25
n DAN BROUILLETTE, named as Assistant Secretary for
Congressional & Intergovernmental Affairs, had been
employed as a lobbyist for mining and oil companies and
as a Congressional aide. 26 In 2004 he left the Department
and later resumed his work as a lobbyist by joining the
Washington government affairs office of Ford Motor Co.27
n VICKY BAILEY, chosen as Assistant Secretary of Policy and
International Affairs, was previously president of PSI
Energy Inc., the Indiana electric-utility operating unit of
Cinergy Corp. Once in office, Bailey helped to formulate
the administration’s energy plan, which proposed weakening emissions standards on compa-
nies such as her former employer.28 She later became a lobbyist for the firm of Johnston &
Associates, whose clients include the Edison Electric Institute.29
n CARL MICHAEL SMITH, selected as Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, had built a career as
an independent oil and gas operator, as Oklahoma’s secretary of energy and then as a lawyer
for energy companies. He had also been a director of the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum
Association from 1981 to 1995. In 2004 he left the Department and resumed work as a cor-
porate lawyer, joining an Oklahoma City firm.30
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
In an apparent attempt to dispel charges that it would back away from environmental protection, the
Bush Administration originally chose Christie Whitman, a moderate Republican who had been gov-
ernor of New Jersey, to head the EPA. Some of the people appointed to work with her in key posi-
tions were, however, from a distinctly pro-business background. Among these were the following:
n LINDA FISHER, chosen to be Deputy Administrator (the agency’s second highest position),
previously spent five years as an executive at pesticide producer Monsanto Co. and had also
practiced law at the firm of Latham & Watkins, known for fighting tougher regulatory stan-
dards on behalf of powerful industry clients.31 Fisher left the EPA in 2003 and later took a
job with DuPont.32
n JEFFREY HOLMSTEAD, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, had not been a cor-
porate executive or lobbyist, but he also worked as an attorney at Latham & Watkins. In addi-
tion to companies such as Cinergy and American Electric Power, his clients included an
industry front group, the Alliance for Constructive Air Policy, which has worked to weaken
air pollution rules.33 In 2004 the Washington Post noted that parts of new rules proposed by
the Bush Administration on power-plant mercury pollution were lifted verbatim from memos
prepared by Latham & Watkins.34
n MARIANNE HORINKO, chosen as Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, was previously president of Clay Associates, a consulting firm where
her clients included the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the Koch Petroleum
Group. Earlier in her career, which also included a stint at the EPA during the George H.W.
Bush Administration, she was an attorney at the corporate law firm Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, where she counseled companies on matters involving pesticides and hazardous
waste.35 In 2003, after Christie Whitman announced her resignation, Horinko served briefly
as the EPA’s Acting Administrator. Horinko left the EPA in 2004, reportedly to spend more
time with her young children.36
Early in Bush’s second term, he named Stephen Johnson, a respected scientist and career agency
employee, to head the EPA. This move, which elicited praise from environmentalists and surprise on
the part of many observers, was one of the few exceptions that prove the rule: it is very unusual to
see someone rise to a key position in a regulatory agency without having come through the reverse
revolving door.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
OSHA, like EPA, is one of the agencies frequently cited by business critics of regulation. In 2001 the
Bush Administration announced that its choice to head the safety agency was John Henshaw, who
had been safety director at Astaris LLC, a joint venture between chemical producers Solutia Inc. (a
spinoff of Monsanto Co.) and FMC Corporation. Before that he worked for many years at Solutia
and Monsanto. 
In November 2001 Henshaw announced that the position of Deputy OSHA administrator was being
given to Gary Visscher, former vice president of employee relations for the American Iron and Steel
Institute, the trade association for the metals industry. 
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According to a detailed analysis published by the Washington Post
in August 2004, Henshaw’s tenure was marked by a reduction in
the number of staffers devoted to developing new safety standards
and by a narrower, more business-friendly approach in those rules
that were proposed.37 Henshaw resigned in December 2004 and
later became an advisor to C2 Facility Solutions, which calls itself
a “critical asset management software firm.”38 Visscher left around
the same time to join the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board.39
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The foregoing examples certainly suggest that the reverse revolv-
ing door affects regulatory policy, but the presence of industry
veterans in public office can also influence contracting decisions,
with major implications for taxpayers. While Defense
Department procurement issues are discussed more fully in the
next chapter, several reverse-revolving-door examples are worth
noting here:
n EDWARD C. “PETE” ALDRIDGE JR. was confirmed as
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics in May 2001. In addition to many years at
the Pentagon, his prior positions included the presidency of
McDonnell Douglas Electronic Systems Co. (now part of
Boeing). In 2003 Aldridge approved the contract for
Lockheed Martin’s controversial F-22 fighter jet. A short
time later he retired from the government and was soon
named to the board of directors of none other than
Lockheed Martin.40 (For more on Aldridge, see Chapter 2.)
n MICHAEL W. WYNNE was made Acting Under Secretary
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics after Aldridge
left the post. Wynne, who had been the Principal Under
Secretary under Aldridge, previously served as senior vice
president of defense contractor General Dynamics. In
August 2005 President Bush nominated Wynne to be
Secretary of the Air Force. 
Other recent secretaries of the three military departments have also been examples of the reverse
revolving door. The man who preceded Wynne as Air Force Secretary, James Roche, was previously
an executive with Northrop Grumman and other military contractors. Army Secretary Francis
Harvey was previously an executive with Westinghouse Corp. and other companies. Gordon
England, who served as Navy Secretary until he was made Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense ear-
lier this year, was previously an executive at General Dynamics. In August 2005 President Bush nom-
inated Donald C. Winter, president of Northrop Grumman Mission Systems, to succeed England. 
Jeffrey Holmstead, Assistant
Administrator for Air and
Radiation, had not been a
corporate executive or
lobbyist, but he also worked
as an attorney at Latham &
Watkins.  In 2004 the
Washington Post noted that
parts of new rules proposed
by the Bush Administration on
power-plant mercury pollution
were lifted verbatim from
memos prepared by Latham &
Watkins. 
Regulation
The movement of lobbyists and business executives into positions with Cabinet departments and reg-
ulatory agencies is largely free from federal regulation. Employment restrictions focus mostly on the
forms of the revolving door that involve movement from the public to the private sector. 
The section of the Code of Federal Regulations dealing with Standards of Ethical Conduct for
Employees of the Executive Branch (Title 5, Chapter XVI, Part 2635) does, however, have a section
on Impartiality in Performing Official Duties that touches partly on the reverse revolving door.
Section 2635.501 says that a federal employee must avoid “an appearance of a loss of impartiality in
the performance of his official duties.” One of the situations in which such an apparent loss of impar-
tiality is said to be possible is the handling of a matter involving a person for whom the federal
employee served, within the last year, as “officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney,
consultant, contractor or employee.”
There are no provisions in federal law or regulations that would prevent someone from accepting
employment with the government because of the possibility that he or she would be called on to han-
dle a matter with a former employer. Instead, the question is whether the federal employee, once in
office, should be allowed to handle specific matters relating to the former employer or be disqualified
from doing so. 
When such situations arise, it is up to the federal employee to determine if there is a potential prob-
lem. Having done so, the employee is supposed to consult the ethics official of the agency (or other
designated official), who is to decide whether the employee should be disqualified from handling the
matter. In doing so, the ethics official is allowed to take into consideration issues such as “the diffi-
culty of reassigning the matter to another employee” (§2635.502). A stricter rule applies when a fed-
eral employee received an “extraordinary payment” of more than $10,000 from a former employer
prior to entering government service. In that case, the employee is automatically disqualified from
handling any matter involving the former employer for a period of two years, though the rule can be
waived under certain conditions (§2635.503).
Although industry veterans are not greatly impeded in their eligibility for federal posts, they, like
other appointees, are subject to disclosure requirements. Persons appointed to senior positions in the
executive branch are required to disclose information about their finances and affiliations on
Standard Form 278, which is available to the public upon written request. It is filed after the person
takes office, annually while in office and one last time after leaving office. Similar information is
required of certain lower-level employees, who are required to file OGE Form 450. However, such
filings are not available to the public. 
Where the disclosure indicates a financial holding that could result in a conflict of interest, the most
common way of handling the matter is for the employee to enter into a written disqualification agree-
ment on the matter, otherwise known as a recusal. This addresses the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 208
barring a federal employee from handling a matter in which the employee or certain relatives have a
financial interest. The Office of Government Ethics exercises some degree of oversight of recusal
agreements. 
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Conclusion
The preceding pages constitute a brief overview of the evolution
of the reverse revolving door—a phenomenon that seems to have
reached unprecedented proportions in recent years. In addition to
looking more systemically at the extent to which key appointed
officials previously worked as corporate executives and lobbyists,
a more thorough analysis would also have to look at the large
number of individuals who entered government office after serv-
ing as lawyers, consultants and scientists. It is likely that many of
those individuals were working for corporate clients or were per-
forming corporate-financed research, suggesting that they would
have a pro-business bias. In other words, the magnitude of busi-
ness influence on policy formulation and industry regulation
through reverse-revolving-door appointments is probably much
larger than this chapter has described.
Determining the extent to which the reverse revolving door has
actually had a distorting effect on public policy is an arduous task.
Once a person has assumed public office, it is difficult to prove
that a particular decision that benefits business was made out of
loyalty to a previous employer or to ingratiate oneself with a
potential future employer. What if the decision was based on the
official’s general view of the world, which happened to have been
shaped by time spent working in the corporate sector? If so, is it
an ethics issue or simply an ideological one?
While it may not be possible to answer these questions with any
certainty, it is clear that a growing number of officials with an
industry background have been participating in the formulation
of policies that unduly benefit the corporate sector. There is no
guarantee that appointees of a different background would have
done things differently, but putting some limits on the reverse
revolving door would help thwart what seems to be the corporate
takeover of regulatory policy and restore greater integrity to the
contracting process. After examining two other forms of revolving
door industry influence, this paper will offer specific recommen-
dations on how to end these conflicts of interest. 
There are no provisions in
federal law or regulations that
would prevent someone from
accepting employment with
the government because of the
possibility that he or she
would be called on to handle a
matter with a former employer.
Instead, the question is
whether the federal employee,
once in office, should be
allowed to handle specific
matters relating to the former
employer or be disqualified
from doing so. 
Chapter 2:
The Government-to-Industry
Revolving Door
How the movement of public officials into lucrative private sector
roles can compromise government procurement, regulatory poli-
cy and the public interest.
by SCOTT AMEY, Project On Government Oversight
LARGE CORPORATIONS FREQUENTLY FIND THEMSELVES dealing with the federal government,
especially when it comes to procurement contracts and regulatory compliance. In doing so, they are
always looking for ways to influence federal decision making—hence their huge spending on lobby-
ists and campaign contributions. Yet money and influence are not the only ways companies seek to
tilt the playing field in their favor. Business also knows the power of information.
One way to get information is to hire the people who have it. Thus we come to the next form of the
revolving door: the movement of public officials into lucrative private sector positions in which they
put their inside knowledge of government to work for their new employer. It has become common
practice for members of the executive branch to leave their government posts and immediately go to
work for companies that have ongoing business with federal agencies.
Defenders of the revolving door hasten to point out that there is nothing inherently improper or ille-
gal when the private sector hires former government officials. Indeed, they argue that the country is
better off because those former officials help companies produce goods and services more effectively. 
The question, however, is whether the revolving door has a detrimental impact on the effectiveness
of federal functions such as contract administration and regulation of business. The concern is that
the inside knowledge public officials bring with them when they join the private sector will be used
in a way that is contrary to the public interest. Even more serious is the possibility that officials still
in office will distort their decision-making to the advantage of prospective employers in the private
sector. These are the issues explored in this chapter. 
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Policy Background
“Each [executive branch] employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its cit-
izens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain. To ensure that
every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employ-
ee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in this section, as well as the
implementing standards contained in this part and in supplemental agency regulations.”41
This statement of the “basic obligation of public service” in federal law may
be straightforward enough for individuals who spend their entire career in
the public sector, but it becomes more complicated for those who go
through the revolving door to the world of business. The recognition that
the federal government needed to address this issue goes back at least to
1965, when President Johnson issued Executive Order (E.O.) 11222,
which instructed agencies to establish “standards of ethical conduct for gov-
ernment officers and employees.” The purpose of this and other conflict-of-
interest and ethics laws was to protect the integrity of the government’s
system of buying goods and services from contractors. President Johnson
stated that “every citizen is entitled to have complete confidence in the
integrity of his [or her] government.”42
Some changes in revolving door policies arrive with each new administration. One of the most dra-
matic shifts came in 1993, when President Clinton strengthened conflict-of-interest laws the very
same day he took office.43 By signing E.O. 12834, also known as the “Senior Appointee Pledge,”
Clinton placed numerous post-employment restrictions on senior executive agency appointees.
Specifically, the order extended the one-year ban to five years, prohibiting former employees from
lobbying their former agencies after they left office. Additionally, former employees of the Executive
Office of the President (EOP) were prohibited from lobbying any other executive agency for which
that employee had “personal and substantial responsibility as a senior appointee in the EOP.”
What seemed like a noble idea upon taking office was apparently viewed differently by Clinton when
his Administration was coming to an end. On December 28, 2000 Clinton revoked the “Senior
Appointee Pledge.”44 In protest, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) stated: “I hope that President Clinton
acts in the remaining days of his presidency to reverse the mistake made by revoking the order against
the revolving door....Using the power of the presidency to reverse a policy he put in place to help
ensure integrity in government service undermines the public’s confidence in political leadership.”45
The George W. Bush Administration did not pay much attention to the revolving door until the
Darleen Druyun-Boeing scandal (see further discussion below) brought the issue to the fore. In
January 2004 the White House issued a Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, establishing “a new Administration policy concerning waivers for senior Administration
appointees who intend to negotiate for outside employment.”46
The memorandum noted that when high-level Presidential appointees begin to negotiate for a new
job outside government, “serious Administration policy interests arise.” It stated:
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To ensure these policy interests are completely considered, effective immediately, agency personnel are pro-
hibited from granting waivers under 18 U.S.C. 208(b)(1) to Senate-confirmed Presidential appointees for
the purpose of negotiating for outside employment unless agency personnel have first consulted with the
Office of the Counsel to the President [emphasis in original].
The purpose of this consultation seemed to be mainly for the benefit of the appointee. The memo
went on to say:
Our most senior Presidential appointees deserve the protection afforded by consultation with the
White House. White House officials have an administration-wide perspective and often know rele-
vant facts unavailable to agency personnel; thus, they can be of tangible assistance when consulted. 
As for the question of how White House lawyers would view the request for a waiver, the memo said: 
The decision to grant a waiver also involves a balancing test. The fulcrum of that balance is a deter-
mination of whether or not the appointee’s financial interest is “so substantial as to affect the integri-
ty of the appointee’s services to the Government” See 5 C.F.R. § 2640.301(a). Because a senior
Presidential appointee may be called upon to advise the White House, it is appropriate that White
House personnel have the opportunity to assess the substantiality of the senior appointee’s financial
interest and how it affects the integrity of the appointee’s service to the President.
The Bush Administration’s policy, however, applies to political appointees only. Many civil service
employees are not affected by the administration’s new policy and will remain off the radar if they
receive an agency conflict-of-interest waiver for post-government employment.47 Days after the
Administration’s policy shift, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered the Department of
Defense (DoD) to investigate whether senior government officials are complying with agency regu-
lations when they seek contractor jobs.
On October 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued a memorandum which
described three minor changes to DoD conflict-of-interest and ethics regulations, including:
n Annual Certification – requiring certain DoD employees to certify annually that they are
aware of the conflict-of-interest and ethics restrictions and that they have not violated those
restrictions.
n Annual Ethics Briefing – requiring DoD offices to include training on relevant federal and
DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in annual ethics briefings.
n Guidance for Departing Personnel – requiring DoD offices to provide guidance on relevant
post-government employment restrictions as part of out-processing procedures for personnel
who leave the government.48
Recently, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service has stated that it will investigate former senior
military and civilian defense managers who now work for defense contractors. Moreover, on February
18, 2005, Paul McNulty, U.S. District Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, announced the
creation of the Procurement Fraud Working Group to investigate defense contractors for conflict-of-
interest violations and procurement fraud.49 McNulty testified before a Senate Armed Services sub-
committee that “more procurement means more opportunity for fraud.”50
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Congress has also shown new interest in the revolving door. Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Robert C.
Byrd (D-WV) and Russell Feingold (D-WI) have been investigating the issue. Senator McCain played
an integral role in obtaining and exposing e-mail that implicated Darleen Druyun. Senators Byrd and
Feingold took a step further when they drafted an amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that would have closed a few of the loopholes in the current revolving door
system.51 Unfortunately, the Byrd-Feingold amendment was not included in the final bill. 
However, members of the House Armed Service Committee
requested a Government Accountability Office review of the
revolving door. The April 2005 report found that:
n DoD has delegated responsibility for training and coun-
seling employees on conflict-of-interest and procurement
integrity rules to more than 2,000 ethics counselors in
DOD’s military services and agencies;
n Those counselors were unable to say if people subject to
procurement integrity rules were trained;
n DoD’s knowledge of defense contractor efforts to pro-
mote ethical standards is limited; and
n A review of one of DoD’s largest contractors showed that
the company lacked controls to ensure an effective ethics
program and the company relied excessively on employees
to self-monitor their compliance with post-government
employment restrictions.52
GAO’s review illustrates the problems with the integrity of the pro-
curement process and the impact that the revolving door has on the
way government spends hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars. 
Revolving Door Laws, Regulations and Loopholes
Federal laws concerning conflicts of interest have been implemented piecemeal over the past fifty
years, and they have become a tangled mess of statutes and regulations as well as exemptions and
waivers (See Appendix A). For instance, some of the statutes and regulations governing executive
branch officials are based on the employee’s pre- and post-government jobs and salaries. Some agen-
cies place additional limitations on their own employees. In some cases, Presidential orders and
agency directives may also govern post-government employment as well.53 In general, government
employees must struggle with a decentralized, multi-layered system of ethics laws and regulations so
convoluted that even ethics officers and specially-trained lawyers find it difficult to fathom. Former
government employees who try to do the right thing may appear to be as dishonest as those who
knowingly violate the law. 
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Major Kathryn Stone, a former Army ethics attorney, reached the
following conclusions about the DoD’s ethics system back in 1993:
In recent years, defense contractors and DoD officials have criti-
cized the multiplicity of DoD ethics laws as a labyrinth of confus-
ing and overlapping requirements. Former DoD officials are
subject to upwards of five different post-government employment
conflict-of-interest laws, each of which applies to different sub-
classes of persons, restricts different activities, and imposes differ-
ent administrative procedures.
No reason exists to have different standards for executive branch
officers and employees as a whole, DoD procurement officials (who
differ depending on the particular statute at issue), retired military
officers, and retired regular military officers. The net result of the
accretion of these five statutes subjects DoD officials to a complex, multi-
tiered system of incomprehensible and seemingly inconsistent statutory
restrictions that are counter-productive to an effective and meaningful
ethics training and counseling program.”54 (Emphasis added).
Conflict-of-interest and ethics laws and regulations are based on a
government employee’s involvement with specific transactions (e.g.,
contracts),55 representation before an employee’s former office,56 and
financial conflicts of interest.57 Yet there are still several significant
loopholes in the system. 
The first loophole involves high-ranking government officials who
are employed in policy positions in which they develop rules and
determine requirements. These policymakers are not restricted from
accepting employment with contractors which may have benefited
from the policies that these employees helped to formulate. This is
especially problematic because senior procurement policymakers,
whose decisions can affect many different contracts, are in a better position to influence a contrac-
tor’s bottom line than an official whose work is limited to a specific contract.
The second loophole is the provision that allows a procurement official to accept compensation from
a “division or affiliate” of the contractor as long as that entity “does not produce the same or similar
products or services” as the barred contracting division.58 In other words, a government official can,
for example, work for a contractor’s missile division if he or she handled contracts with its aircraft
division—and therefore avoid the one-year ban on accepting compensation from a contractor during
post-government employment pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 423. The current system does little to stop a
contractor from rewarding a government employee for favorable treatment with post-government
employment in a different division of the same company. The company in such a circumstance would
be doubly rewarded, possibly receiving favorable treatment or insider advice because of the ex-offi-
cial’s ties to his or her former peers. It also creates the opportunity for the former government employ-
ee to do work behind the scenes for the other divisions of the company.
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"The net result of the
accretion of these five
statutes subjects DoD
officials to a complex, 
multi-tiered system of
incomprehensible and
seemingly inconsistent
statutory restrictions that are
counter-productive to an
effective and meaningful
ethics training and 
counseling program."  
A third loophole involves the lack of executive branch rules requiring the reporting and public dis-
closure of disqualifications or recusal. Executive branch regulations obligate an employee to disqual-
ify him or herself from conflicted matters.59 The prohibition on prospective employment (18 U.S.C.
§ 208), however, does not require an employee to file a disclosure or recusal statement when a con-
flict arises.60 It is only after multiple layers of regulations that certain agencies mandate that notice of
a conflict must be provided to a government employee’s supervisor.61
Revolving Door Case Studies
DARLEEN DRUYUN AND BOEING. Darleen Druyun has become the poster child for the conflicts of
interest created by the revolving door. Druyun supervised, directed and oversaw the management of
the Air Force’s weapons acquisition program before she moved through the revolving door to become
Boeing’s Deputy General Manager for Missile Defense Systems. Specifically, Druyun was in charge
of overseeing some of the government’s largest purchases, including the C-17 cargo plane and the
proposal to lease refueling aircraft (also known as tankers)—a proposal that was more costly than
actually purchasing the tankers.
E-mail exchanges between Druyun’s daughter and Boeing officials revealed how all parties violated
the conflict-of-interest and ethics system. On January 6, 2003, when Druyun left the government to
work for Boeing, the Project On Government Oversight issued a press release, stating that “Ms.
Druyun is now officially an employee of the company whose interests she so ardently championed
while she was supposedly representing the interests of the taxpayers.”62 Subsequent disclosures showed
that she was negotiating the terms of her Boeing employment while she was handling the Boeing
tanker lease, estimated to be worth over $20 billion.63 On November 24, 2003, Boeing fired Druyun
and Chief Financial Officer Michael Sears in connection with potentially illegal discussions of mat-
ters involving Boeing that had taken place during the time Druyun was a government employee. 
On April 20, 2004, Druyun pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States. In
her plea, Druyun acknowledged that she had favored Boeing in certain negotiations as a result of her
employment negotiations and that other favors had been provided by Boeing to her. Druyun also
admitted that Boeing’s hiring, at her request, of her future son-in-law and her daughter in 2000,
along with her own desire to be employed by Boeing, influenced her decisions–as a government
employee–in several matters affecting Boeing. These included: the Boeing tanker deal (which she stat-
ed was a “‘parting gift to Boeing”), Boeing’s $100 million payment to restructure the NATO AWACS
program, the selection of Boeing to upgrade the avionics of C-130 aircraft, and the agreement “to a
payment of approximately 412 million dollars to Boeing” in connection with the C-17.64 In October
2004, Druyun was sentenced to nine months in prison, a $5,000 fine, three years of supervised
release, and 150 hours of community service. 65
The Associated Press reported on February 2005, that the Pentagon was investigating eight Air Force
contracts handled by Druyun.66 Those contracts ranged in value from $42 million to $1.5 billion each,
with a total value of about $3 billion.67 That same month, the GAO released two Comptroller General
opinions in which it found that Druyun had tainted the process in which Boeing was awarded con-
tracts for the production of the Small Diameter Bomb and for various activities related to the avion-
ics modernization upgrade program for C-130 aircraft.68 The GAO recommended that both contracts,
or the tainted portions therein, be put out for new competition.69 
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PETE ALDRIDGE AND LOCKHEED MARTIN. Edward C. “Pete”
Aldridge formerly served as Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. He was also head of a DoD
review board which made the decision to pursue procurement of
the Lockheed Martin F/A-22 fighter jet. In January 2003, Aldridge
approved the contract for the F/A-22 program.70 Two months later,
he secured a position on the board of directors of Lockheed Martin,
the federal government’s top contractor and maker of the F/A-22.
On March 15, 2004, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
released a report documenting that the cost for the F/A-22 program
continues to skyrocket, though DoD has failed to justify the need
for this aircraft, given current and projected threats.71
Adding to the appearance of conflict of interest on Aldridge’s
resume, President Bush signed an Executive Order on January 27,
2004 establishing the Commission on Implementation of United
States Space Exploration Policy and then announced that Aldridge
would chair the nine-member Commission. Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) spoke out against Aldridge’s appointment, asserting that the
former top weapons buyer and current Lockheed board member
had too many conflicts of interest to serve as a Commission mem-
ber. Because Lockheed is one of NASA’s largest contractors,
Aldridge was placed in a position to influence public policies that
could benefit the company he served.
DAVID HEEBNER AND GENERAL DYNAMICS. Army Lt. General
David K. Heebner was a top assistant to the Army Chief of Staff,
Gen. Eric Shinseki, and played a significant role in drumming up
support and funding for Shinseki’s plan to transform the Army. One of the key elements in Shinseki’s
transformation “vision” was a plan to move the Army away from tracked armored vehicles toward
wheeled light armored vehicles. In October 1999, only three months before Heebner retired,
Shinseki’s “Army Vision” statement called for an interim armored brigade: “We are prepared to move
to an all wheel formation as soon as technology permits.” General Dynamics, which manufactures
the wheeled Stryker, was the beneficiary of this new vision, essentially putting United Defense, which
produced tracked vehicles, out of the running. 
General Dynamics formally announced the hiring of Heebner, as Senior Vice President of Planning
and Development, on November 20, 1999. That was just one month after Shinseki announced his
“vision” and more than a month prior to Heebner’s official retirement date of December 31, 1999.
The $4 billion Stryker contract was awarded to General Dynamics in November 2000. Heebner was
present in Alabama for the April 2002 rollout of the first Stryker and was recognized by Shinseki for
his work in the Army on the Stryker project. 
BOBBY FLOYD AND LOCKHEED MARTIN. In 1997, Air Force General Bobby O. Floyd led the gov-
ernment’s investigation into a fatal HC-130P Hercules plane crash. According to press reports, in
October 1998, Floyd was contacted by the plane’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.72 He filed a let-
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On April 20, 2004, Druyun
pleaded guilty to charges of
conspiracy to defraud the
United States. In her plea,
Druyun acknowledged that
she had favored Boeing in
certain negotiations as a
result of her employment
negotiations and that other
favors had been provided by
Boeing to her.  
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ter of recusal, which disqualified him from taking any official actions involving Lockheed, in
November 1998. Despite that recusal, Floyd continued to investigate the crash until March 1999,73
concluding that his new employer was free from blame.74 Despite that appearance of impropriety, the
Air Force concluded that Floyd did not violate conflict-of-interest or ethics laws.75 Floyd then joined
Lockheed Martin Aircraft & Logistics Centers in May 1999 as Deputy General Manager of the
Greenville Aircraft Center. He was promoted to Vice President and General Manager in May 2000,
then to President and General Manager of Logistics for the Centers in November 2001. 
RICHARD PERLE AND BOEING. Perle served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan
Administration and was a member of the Defense Policy Board from 1987 to 2004, serving as its
Chair from 2001 to 2003. He resigned as Chairman in March 2003, after a conflict-of-interest con-
troversy involving a consulting job he took with the bankrupt telecommunications firm Global
Crossing Ltd. During the summer of 2003, Perle expressed his support for the Boeing tanker deal—
a deal that would direct billions of dollars to Boeing. His support for the tankers came just 16 months
after Boeing committed to invest $20 million with Perle’s venture capital firm, Trireme Partners.76
A Washington Post article described Perle as the “ultimate insider” and discussed his use of the revolv-
ing door and the access that it provides.77 William Happer, a former Energy Department official stat-
ed that the revolving door is “an old American tradition, and Richard Perle I think is doing it in an
honest way. He’s one of hundreds and hundreds who do it.”78 Perle denied that he was hired by any
company because of his connection to policymakers. Subsequently, Perle seemed to contradict him-
self when recounting his role in assisting a company to obtain a foreign contract: “Was [his contact
with foreign ambassadors] a result of my influence? Yeah, it was. It was a result of the fact that they,
the people I went to, knew me so they took my phone call.”79
Examples of the Revolving Door in Various Federal Agencies
Former federal officials can be found in key executive and board positions at many of the country’s
largest corporations and trade associations. Here are some examples involving veterans of several
Cabinet departments—Agriculture, Defense and Energy—as well as the EPA.80
n FRANCIS S. BLAKE, Executive Vice President of Business Development and Corporate
Operations for Home Depot and a director of The Southern Company (a “super-regional”
energy company), formerly served as Deputy Secretary of Energy. 81
n LINDA FISHER, Vice President and Chief Sustainability Officer for chemical giant DuPont,
formerly served in various positions at the EPA, including Deputy Administrator, Assistant
Administrator and Chief of Staff.82
n L. VAL GIDDINGS, Vice President for Food and Agriculture of the Biotechnology Industry
Organization, formerly served as the Senior Staff Geneticist, International Team Leader, and
Branch Chief for Science and Policy Coordination with the biotechnology products regula-
tory division of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of
Agriculture. 83
n JAMIE S. GORELICK, a director of defense contractor United Technologies, was formerly
Deputy Attorney General and General Counsel of the Department of Defense (as well as a
member of the 9-11 Commission and the Defense Science Board).84
n PAUL LONGSWORTH, who recently joined Fluor Corp. as executive director of environmen-
tal/nuclear business development, was formerly deputy administrator at the Energy
Department's National Nuclear Security Administration.85
n CHARLES J. (JOE) O’MARA, President of O’Mara & Associates, an international trade con-
sulting firm, formerly served as Counsel for International Affairs to the Secretary of
Agriculture and as Special Trade Negotiator for the agency.86
n DR. JAMES G. ROCHE, a director of Orbital Sciences Corp., a leading space and rocket com-
pany, and a consultant for his former employer, Northrop Grumman, was formerly Secretary
of the Air Force.87
n JAMES SCHLESINGER, a director of British Nuclear Fuel, formerly served as Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 88
n CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, a director of United Technologies, which aside from being a
military contractor is deeply involved in global warming because of its ownership of the air-
conditioning company Carrier Corp., formerly served as Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency.89
n JOHN WILCYNSKI, Vice President of Corporate Development at British Nuclear Fuels, for-
merly served as the Department of Energy’s Director of the Office of Field Management.90
Conclusion
Each of the five foregoing examples illustrates how decisions involving billions of taxpayer dollars
have been shaped by those with revolving-door conflicts of interest. In some cases, such as the
Druyun affair, it became clear that corruption was involved and laws were broken. In other cases, the
culpability is less apparent.
Whether the prospect of lucrative private sector employment actually causes an official to violate his or
her public trust or whether there is simply the appearance of a conflict, the revolving door does tend to
create problems for integrity in government. The existing laws and regulations that address this prob-
lem are complex but ultimately inadequate. In the conclusion of this paper we offer some recommen-
dations for restoring a greater degree of public confidence in the operations of the public sector. 
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Chapter 3:
The Government-to-Lobbyist
Revolving Door
How former lawmakers and politicians use their inside 
connections to advance the policy and regulatory interests 
of their industry clients.
by CRAIG HOLMAN, Public Citizen
THE REVOLVING DOOR FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND CAPITOL HILL to well-paid lobbying firms
(many of which are conveniently housed in the same neighborhood along K Street) has been spin-
ning out of control in recent years. Senior-level staff in the executive and Congressional branches of
government and even Members of Congress have shown an increasing inclination to leave public
service and then continue to try to shape public policy—as lobbyists acting on behalf of special inter-
ests in the private sector.91 Some of them pass through the revolving door as the result of an election
defeat or a change in Administration, but most are enticed by the prospect of collecting a fat pay-
check while continuing to play insider politics on Capitol Hill. 
Rep. James Greenwood (R-Pa.) made no bones about the reason for his career switch from chair of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s subcommittee on oversight and investigations to
head the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), a lobbying association. BIO agreed to pay
Greenwood $650,000 a year (plus as much as $200,000 in bonuses) to serve as its chief lobbyist.
“This is bittersweet,” Greenwood said of his unexpected retirement from Congress. “But at this point
in my life, it’s more sweet by far.”92
What was sweet for Greenwood left a sour taste for many others. BIO had first contacted him about a
job in early 2004, only a month or so after he announced his intention to investigate the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. The fact that Greenwood, a social worker before he entered politics 24 years earlier, had no
background in biotechnology or related fields seemed to make little difference to the trade association.93
He was sought for his political connections. The public was finally made aware of Greenwood’s new
career choice in July 2004, when he abruptly canceled an oversight hearing concerning the drug Zoloft,
produced by Pfizer, one of whose executives was serving on the BIO board at the time. “I understand
how this could raise an eyebrow,” Greenwood said with regard to the Pfizer connection, but he denied
there was any conflict of interest: “B following A does not mean that A caused B.”94
Once comfortably ensconced in the K Street community, Greenwood began expanding the staff of
BIO by hiring other refugees from the public sector. As one newspaper account put it: “In the last
several months, BIO has raided the offices of Congress, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and the Food and Drug Administration to build an executive staff with inside-the-beltway
savvy and connections.”95
Current Government-to-Lobbyist Revolving Door Restrictions 
Former government officials who have become lobbyists are subject to limited statutory requirements
and ethics regulations. Two different sets of ethics codes apply to the revolving door movement of
government officials into private-sector lobbying. The two general categories of ethics restrictions
that govern the government-to-lobbyist revolving door include:
n The conflict-of-interest restrictions on the ability of government officials to negotiate future
employment while serving in public office. 
n The “cooling off period” on lobbying activities by former officials for a specified period of
time after leaving public service. 
Both principles comprise the overall revolving-door policy, and both are designed to prevent a con-
flict between the duty of public servants to provide for the common good and the obligation of pri-
vate lobbyists to promote a special interest. These ethics restrictions are laid out in a web of statutory
limits, which apply to all branches of government, and ethics regulations, which are different for the
executive branch, the Senate, the House and different salary levels of their respective staff. As such,
there is no single revolving-door code that applies to all government officials and employees.
Negotiation of Future Employment
Federal criminal conflict of interest statutes (18 U.S.C. §201) prohibit any public official from solic-
iting or accepting a “thing of value” in exchange for a legislative favor or other official action–i.e., a
bribe. Within this legal framework, the Senate and House, and the Office of Government Ethics for
the executive branch, have promulgated ethics regulations to guide their respective officers and
employees away from crossing this line. 
Ethics rules go a step beyond actual quid pro quo corruption, which is very difficult to prove short
of an FBI sting operation, and rely instead upon the standard of the appearance of corruption. Ethics
rules prescribe that public officials and employees generally are not to act in such a way as to create
the appearance of impropriety in official actions. Each institution fashions its own ethics guidelines
to prevent the appearance of conflict of interest that would impugn the integrity of the office.
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For officers and employees in the executive
branch, federal law (18 U.S.C. §208) gener-
ally prohibits government staff from seeking
future employment and working on official
acts simultaneously, if the official actions may
be of significant benefit to the potential
employer. Waivers may be granted to this
prohibition for a number of reasons, such as
when the employee’s self-interest is “not so
substantial” as to affect the integrity of serv-
ices provided by the employee, or if the need
for the employee’s services outweighs the
potential for a conflict of interest. The
issuance of waivers had routinely been the
prerogative of the head of the agency or divi-
sion for which the employee works.
Following several conflict-of-interest contro-
versies, President Bush issued a
Memorandum on January 6, 2004, requiring
that all such waivers be cleared by the White
House General Counsel.
Ethics rules on negotiating future employ-
ment are not as strict for members and staff
of the Senate, and even less so for the House.
Both the Senate and House codes of ethics
prohibit members and staff from receiving
compensation “by virtue of influence
improperly exerted” from their official posi-
tions. To this end, the Senate and House rules
advise members and staff to recuse them-
selves from official actions of interest to a
prospective employer while job negotiations
are underway. But the ethics codes differ
from that point on.
Senate rules detail recusal guidelines. Under normal circumstances, a Senate employee who delivers
his or her resume to a group of fifty prospective employers would not, at this early stage, need to
recuse him or herself. Whether recusal would be necessary after the employee met with ten of those
prospective employers would depend, of course, upon the results of each meeting. On the other hand,
once the employee has directed his or her attention on two or three of the prospective employers for
further discussions, recusal is likely necessary. A Senate employee, however, with the supervising
Senator’s approval, may continue to be involved with issues that may be of interest to the prospective
employer during the limited period that the employee remains with the Senate. Generally, each
Member must decide for himself or herself, as well as for his or her staff members, what steps would
be necessary to avoid not only the conflict which may arise from negotiating or accepting prospec-
tive employment, but the appearance of such a conflict as well.96
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Rep. James Greenwood (R-Pa.) made no bones
about the reason for his career switch from
chair of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee's subcommittee on oversight and
investigations to head the Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO), a lobbying
association. BIO agreed to pay Greenwood
$650,000 a year (plus as much as $200,000 in
bonuses) to serve as its chief lobbyist. "This is
bittersweet," Greenwood said of his
unexpected retirement from Congress. "But at
this point in my life, it's more sweet by far."
House rules are far more general. Members and staff of the House
are advised to be particularly careful in how they go about nego-
tiating for future employment, especially when negotiating with
someone who could be substantially affected by the performance
of official duties. It would be improper to permit the prospect of
future employment to influence official actions. Therefore, while
it is not specifically required, one should consider recusing oneself
from any official activities affecting an outside party with whom
job negotiations are under way. 97
In the Executive branch, Senate and House, negotiations for
future employment are commonplace and allegations of impro-
priety are frequent. No government employee will admit that
employment negotiations influenced his or her official actions,
and most will deny that they negotiated employment while work-
ing on an official action of interest to the prospective employer.
Nevertheless, the timing and nature of many recent job changes
by public officials–some of which are discussed below–have raised
valid suspicions that conflict-of-interest rules are routinely violat-
ed through the revolving door. 
Post-Government Employment Lobbying
Restrictions
Under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (18 U.S.C. §207), mem-
bers and staff of both the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government are subject to restrictions on post-government
lobbying activities. While any former government official or
employee may accept a position as a lobbyist immediately after leaving the public sector, there are
some specific constraints on their activities, depending on the nature of their previous public service.
These constraints include:
n ONE YEAR “COOLING-OFF PERIOD” ON LOBBYING. Generally, former Members of
Congress and senior level staff of both the executive and legislative branches are prohibited
from making direct lobbying contacts with former colleagues for one year after leaving pub-
lic service. Specifically, for one year after leaving government office:
n Former members of the Senate and the House may not directly communicate with
any member, officer or employee of either house of Congress with the intent to influ-
ence official action. 
n Senior Congressional staff (having made at least 75 percent of a member’s salary) may
not make direct lobbying contacts to Members of Congress they served, or the mem-
bers and staff of legislative committees or offices in which they served.
n Former Members of Congress and senior staff also may not represent, aid or advise a
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Ethics rules go a step 
beyond actual quid pro quo
corruption, which is very
difficult to prove short of an
FBI sting operation, and rely
instead upon the standard of
the appearance of corruption. 
foreign government or foreign political party with the intent to influence a decision
by any federal official in the executive or legislative branches.
n “Very senior” staff of the executive branch, those previously classified within
Executive Schedules I and II salary ranges, are prohibited from making direct lobby-
ing contacts with any political employee in the executive branch.
n “Senior” staff of the executive branch, those previously paid at Executive Schedule V
and up, are prohibited from making direct lobbying contacts to their former agency
or on behalf of a foreign government or foreign political party. 
n Any former government employee, regardless of previous salary, may not use confi-
dential information obtained by means of personal and substantial participation in
trade or treaty negotiations in representing, aiding or advising anyone other than the
United States regarding those negotiations.
n TWO-YEAR BAN ON “SWITCHING SIDES” BY SUPERVISORY STAFF OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH. Senior staff in the executive branch who served in a supervisory role over an offi-
cial matter that involved a specific party, such as a government contract, may not make lob-
bying contacts on the same matter with executive agencies for two years after leaving public
service.
n LIFE-TIME BAN ON “SWITCHING SIDES” BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL SUB-
STANTIALLY AND PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE MATTER. Senior staffers in the execu-
tive branch who were substantially and personally involved in an official matter that involved
a specific party, such as a government contract, are permanently prohibited from making lob-
bying contacts on the same matter with executive agencies.
The cooling-off period applies only to making “any communication to or appearance before” the
restricted government agencies or personnel. As a result, former public officials may conduct all the
research, preparation, planning and supervision for lobbying their former agencies or personnel
immediately upon leaving public office, so long as they do not make the actual lobbying contact dur-
ing the cooling-off period. The former official may simply direct other lobbyists to make the contact.
While these revolving door restrictions may appear fairly stringent at first glance, many of the restric-
tions are easily and routinely sidestepped. Negotiations of future employment while serving as a gov-
ernment official are commonplace, and the potential for conflicts of interest are largely left
unmonitored. The post-government cooling-off period is brief and applies only to making lobbying
contacts with former government colleagues. 
In negotiating future employment as a lobbyist while still serving in an official capacity in govern-
ment, Members of Congress and senior staff are warned not to be unduly influenced by the prospects
of lucrative job offers, but they may nonetheless go ahead and negotiate salaries and employment.
Though recusal from participating in official actions where a conflict of interest occurs is suggested
in both the Senate and the House, it is not mandated. While recusals by Members of Congress or
senior staff members are rare, the hiring of Congressional officials as corporate lobbyists is not. 
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No one is keeping tabs on who in Congress is negotiating for what employment and, as a result, no one
is enforcing the recusal guidelines in any systematic fashion. For the most part, the Senate and House
ethics committees are completely in the dark as to who is negotiating future employment and who
should recuse themselves from official business, unless of course a scandal is uncovered in the press.
Case Study on Negotiating Future Employment by Executive and
Congressional Staff: the Revolving Door Windfall from the Medicare
Drug Prescription Bill
In the executive branch, waivers often required for negotiating future employment are routinely
granted and rarely, if ever, denied. A freedom of information request by Public Citizen to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) found that from January 1, 2000 through
November 17, 2004, 37 formal requests for waivers from the conflict-of-interest statutes were made
in that department alone. All 37 requests were granted and none denied.98
One of the granted waivers sheds light on the Thomas Scully scandal. On May 12, 2003, Scully, chief
administrator for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), secretly obtained an ethics
waiver from Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson, allowing Scully to
ignore ethics laws that barred him from negotiating employment with anyone financially affected by
his official duties or authority. The waiver allowed Scully to represent the Bush Administration in
negotiations with Congress over the recently-enacted Medicare prescription drug legislation while
Scully simultaneously negotiated possible employment with three lobbying firms and two investment
firms that had a major stakes in the legislation.
A Public Citizen investigation has revealed that these firms own or represent dozens of health care
companies, trade associations, and physicians’ organizations with billions of dollars at stake in the
new law.99 The three lobby firms with which Scully negotiated possible employment lobby for at least
30 companies or associations that are affected by the new Medicare law. The two investment firms
own substantial stakes in at least 11 companies that are affected by the Medicare changes.
Scully resigned from the CMS on December 16, 2003. Two days later, he announced that he had
accepted lucrative contracts with two of the five firms he had been negotiating with while CMS
administrator: Alston & Bird, a firm with many health care industry clients, and Welsh, Carson,
Anderson & Stowe, an investment firm with investments in health care companies.
Scully is not alone. A slew of senior executive and Congressional staffers cashed in on the Medicare
prescription drug law that they helped write and promote. Another study by Public Citizen docu-
mented many of the key staff who profited on the prescription drug bill through the revolving door. 100
These included:
n THOMAS GRISSOM, director of the Center for Medicare Management, who just a day after
the Medicare bill was signed into law, jumped ship to become the top lobbyist for medical
device maker Boston Scientific. As a top official at CMS, Grissom was in charge of develop-
ing reimbursement policies and regulations for the Medicare fee-for-service program and
overseeing Medicare’s $240 billion contractor budget.
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n DALLAS “ROB” SWEEZY, director of public and inter-
governmental affairs at CMS, who in January 2004 joined
National Media Inc., the advertising firm hired by the
Bush administration to produce television ads touting the
new Medicare law. In May, Sweezy moved over to the lob-
bying firm Loeffler Jonas and Tuggey, which represents
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Purdue Pharma, First Health and
PacifiCare.
n JAMES C. CAPRETTA, the top official on Medicare poli-
cy development at the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), who left the White House in mid-June 2004 to
join Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates.
Pharmaceutical companies Amgen, Hoffman-LaRoche
and Wyeth are among the firm’s clients.
n JACK HOWARD, a former deputy director of legislative
affairs for President Bush, who now works at Wexler &
Walker Public Policy Associates. From 2001 to 2003,
Howard promoted the president’s agenda in Congress as
the second-ranking member of the White House legisla-
tive affairs operation. Howard’s current clients include
Amgen, PacifiCare and Wyeth.
n DIRKSEN LEHMAN, who served as the chief White House
liaison to the Senate for Medicare, Medicaid and other
health care regulations, became a lobbyist for Clark &
Weinstock in May 2003. During the Medicare debate, he
focused on key Senate committees on behalf of clients
such as Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Novartis and the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA).
n ROBERT MARSH, another White House legislative affairs
staffer, who has been connected to White House Chief of
Staff Andrew Card since George H.W. Bush’s first presi-
dential run in 1979. Marsh left the White House in 2003
to join the OB-C Group, where he has represented the
Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and WellPoint.
n KIRK BLALOCK, who as deputy director of the White House Office of Public Liaison, regu-
larly strategized with Karl Rove and rallied business support for the president’s tax cuts and
other issues. Among his clients at Fierce, Isakowitz & Blalock (the firm he joined in 2002)
are the Generic Pharmaceutical Association and the Health Insurance Association of America.
Blalock is also a leading fundraiser for President Bush.
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The cooling-off period applies
only to making "any
communication to or
appearance before" the
restricted government agencies
or personnel. As a result,
former public officials may
conduct all the research,
preparation, planning and
supervision for lobbying their
former agencies or personnel
immediately upon leaving
public office, so long as they do
not make the actual lobbying
contact during the cooling-off
period. The former official may
simply direct other lobbyists to
make the contact.
n ROBERT WOOD, former chief of staff for HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson, who was hired
by Barbour, Griffith & Rogers in June 2003. Wood directs state affairs at Barbour Griffith,
but lobbied Congress on behalf of Bristol-Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, PhRMA
and the United Health Group.
n LINDA FISHMAN, who served as the lead Senate staff member for the Medicare conference
committee.101 She since has joined Hogan & Hartson, whose clients include
GlaxoSmithKline and PhRMA, as a health policy adviser.102
n COLIN ROSKEY, who just three days after the signing of the Medicare law, for which he was
one of the lead Senate negotiators, left his job as health policy adviser and counsel for the
Senate Finance Committee to take a position with Alston & Bird – the same firm that hired
former Medicare chief Tom Scully.103
n SARAH WALTER, who left her position as legislative director and chief health policy adviser
for Sen. John Breaux (D-La.), one of the two Democrats who participated in negotiations
over the Medicare bill, to take a position with Venn Strategies.104
n JOHN MCMANUS, who as staff director of the House Ways and Means Committee’s health
subcommittee, was one of the key architects of the Medicare legislation. However, just two
months after the Medicare bill became law, McManus left the House to start his own health
care consulting firm, the McManus Group. McManus–who worked as a lobbyist for Eli Lilly
from 1994 to 1998–already has lined up an impressive number of big-name clients from
throughout the healthcare industry, including PhRMA and Genentech. 105
n PATRICK MORRISEY, who served as the deputy staff director and chief health counsel for the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, chaired by Rep. W.J. “Billy” Tauzin (R-La.), was
hired in March 2004 by Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, a lobbying firm that represents
PhRMA, Genentech and the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO).106
n Morrisey’s colleague JAMES WHITE left his position as Tauzin’s legislative director to join
Abbott Laboratories as director of federal government affairs in January 2004.107 Abbott, the
Chicago-based manufacturer of Prevacid, Norvir and other brand-name drugs, spent $3.7
million to lobby the federal government last year. 
These new arrivals on K Street joined at least three dozen former Congressional chiefs of staff already
lobbying for the drug and managed care industries in 2003. The list includes Cathy Abernathy, for-
mer chief of staff for Rep. Bill Thomas (R-CA); Alex Albert, who worked for Sen. Zell Miller (D-GA);
Edwin Buckham and Susan B. Hirshmann, two former top staffers for House Majority Whip Tom
DeLay (R-TX); David Castagnetti, who headed the office of Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT), the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee; Dave Gribbin, a former chief of staff for Sen. Dan Coats
(R-IN) who worked for Dick Cheney when he was a Wyoming congressman; Kevin McGuiness, who
left the office of Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) to open up a lobbying shop with the senator’s son; and
Daniel Meyer, the ex-chief of staff for former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA.).
The Medicare prescription drug episode highlights the opportunities granted to government staff who
have worked on a major piece of legislation dear to the hearts of wealthy special interests. But the
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revolving door from government service to private sector lobbyist
extends far beyond any single piece of legislation. It appears to be an
increasingly common job transition in recent years. 
The Center for Public Integrity surveyed how often the revolving
door has turned for the top 100 officers of the executive branch at
the end of the Clinton Administration.108 Tracking the movement of
administration secretaries and under-secretaries for each major exec-
utive agency, the Center concluded that about a quarter of senior-
level administrators left public service for lobbying careers. Another
quarter of the administrators accepted positions as directors of pri-
vate businesses they had once regulated.
At least 17 top Clinton staffers have taken lobbying jobs on behalf of
corporate or individual clients, including former Deputy Secretary of
Treasury Stuart Eizenstat and former Director of White House
Legislative Affairs Charles Brain. Another ten joined law firms that
actively lobby the federal government, including three former
Cabinet members: Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman, Interior
Chief Bruce Babbitt, and Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater.
Most of these officials flew through the revolving door into private
sector lobbying immediately upon leaving public service. Clearly,
the cooling-off period that prohibits officials from making direct lobbying contacts with their former
colleagues has not slowed the revolving door. Businesses and special interest groups find plenty of
value in hiring former government officials right out the door, despite the one-year prohibition on
making lobbying contacts. The offer of a lucrative salary to these officials while still in public service
can influence their actions. Just as importantly, their connections and insider knowledge does not go
to waste during the cooling-off period. That knowledge becomes invaluable in crafting a lobbying
strategy, knowing who in government needs to be contacted and what appeals may gain their sup-
port. During that one-year cooling off period, Members of Congress and committee compositions
will generally stay the same, and there is very little turnover in congressional and executive agency
staff. Those who passed through the revolving door need only direct others in the lobbying team to
make the lobbying contacts—and in doing so convey warm regards from the former officials to their
government colleagues.
Making a Living
The revolving door functions even during natural disasters. As billions of federal dollars flow to the Gulf Coast to
repair the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, lobbyists are making sure their corporate clients get a share of the
loot. One of the more active of those lobbyists is Joe Allbaugh, former director of the much maligned Federal
Emergency Management Agency (and prior to that, George W. Bush’s campaign manager during the 2000 elec-
tion).109 Before Katrina, Allbaugh was helping clients get reconstruction contracts in Iraq. In 2004 the National
Journal asked Allbaugh about charges that he was cashing in on his service to the Bush Administration. He
responded: “I don’t buy the ‘revolving door’ argument. This is America. We all have a right to make a living.”110
Allbaugh, whose clients include Halliburton Co. (which has already gotten its first Katrina-related contract),
appears to be making a very good living these days—so much so that an article in the online magazine Slate labeled
him a “disaster pimp.”111
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The Revolving Door for Members of Congress
Judging from their newly-won salaries in the private sector, per-
haps the biggest prize for special interest groups with official busi-
ness pending before the federal government is to secure the
lobbying services of a recently retired Member of Congress. It is
not an entirely new phenomenon to see a retiring Member of
Congress accept a lobbying job with a firm or special interest
group. But this revolving door appears to be turning with much
more frequency these days. 
Though it is difficult to produce reliable figures for the number
of Congressional members-turned-lobbyists prior to the stringent
reporting requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of
1995, one study cited by Common Cause found that only about
3 percent of Members of Congress left government service in the
decade of the 1970s to become lobbyists.112 A study by Public
Citizen that is limited to the election cycles of 1976 and 1978
suggests the figure may be somewhat higher, with about 9 percent
of Members of Congress who had retired in that decade still reg-
istered to lobby when the reliable reporting requirements of LDA
became effective in 1998.113 The bottom line is that the revolving
door for Members of Congress was not as common a means of
career change as it is now.
The rate at which members of Congress spin through the revolv-
ing door has skyrocketed since then. According to an analysis by
Public Citizen, the road from Congress to K Street is now very
well traveled, and is the most common career path for Members
of Congress. As of July 2005, about 215 former Members of
Congress have registered as active lobbyists with the Clerk of the
House and the Secretary of the Senate under the requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1996. These lobbyists have served in Congress at some point between 1976 and 2004 (most of them
having served fairly recently) and have filed lobbyist financial records showing lobbying activity in
2004-05.114
The percentage of Members of Congress retiring from public service for reasons other than death,
conviction or election to other office and stepping into lobbying has fluctuated each Congressional
session in the decade of the 2000s, never dipping below a third and reaching a high of almost half
(46 percent) of the retiring Members of Congress in a single election cycle. This marks a dramatic
increase over the 1970s. 
Significantly, Public Citizen’s analysis reveals that the K Street Project is working to the advantage of
Republicans. The K Street Project was first developed in 1994 by Republican activist Grover
Norquist, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA.) and Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX) to pressure major lobbying
firms to hire Republicans rather than Democrats, thus helping to solidify Republican control over all
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aspects of the legislative process in Washington.115 The revolving-door figures for Members of
Congress suggest that the Project has had an impact on Capitol Hill in the most recent decade. The
rate of Democrats retiring from Congress and becoming lobbyists has fluctuated over the last few
years, ranging from 15.4 percent in 2000, 16.7 percent in 2002 and 38.5 percent in 2004. The rate
of Republicans retiring from Congress and becoming lobbyists over the same time period has been
substantially higher, from 56.8 percent in 2000, 46.7 percent in 2002 and 47.6 percent in 2004.116
Though Republicans currently are enjoying an advantage when it comes to the revolving door,
Members of Congress from both parties now have a greater inclination to pursue lobbying careers
than in earlier decades. Today’s greater propensity for retiring Members of Congress from both par-
ties to join the ranks of K Street comes from a number of new incentives. First of all, despite parti-
san claims to roll back government outlays, federal government spending today is at an all-time high.
More government contracts and federal grants are being awarded than ever before, and spending on
social services and infrastructure development has risen dramatically. 
Secondly, government regulations–or lack thereof–touch nearly every sector of business and social
life, which is why the amount spent on lobbying the federal government is also at an all-time high.
Last but not least, special interest groups today see so much at stake in the legislative and regulatory
dealings of the federal government that most lobbyists are paid very handsomely. The closer a lobby-
ist is to the networks of Congressional power, the more a special interest group is willing to pay. And
no one is more intimately involved in these networks than recently retired Members of Congress. As
a result, several recent Congressional retirees have attracted multi-million dollar job offers with lob-
bying firms and associations.
Former Rep. W.J. “Billy” Tauzin (R-La.) is but one example. Once again the Medicare prescription
drug bill has come into play. Rep. Tauzin played a central role in drafting and negotiating the legis-
lation. PhRMA, the pharmaceutical industry’s premier lobbying association, made the prescription
drug bill its top legislative priority. Massive campaign contributions, lobbying expenditures, adver-
tising and public relations efforts were spearheaded by PhRMA to shape the prescription drug bill in
ways the industry liked and to stave off measures it didn’t. Rep. Tauzin worked closely with PhRMA,
the White House, and Republican leaders of Congress to craft the final legislation.
During that period of intense lobbying activity by PhRMA, Rep. Tauzin was considering retiring
from Congress and moving into private employment. Less than two months after final passage of the
Medicare prescription drug bill, PhRMA offered Rep. Tauzin a contract deal rumored to be worth $2
million to become president of the lobbying association, the largest compensation package for any-
one at a trade association. Tauzin decided to take the offer after retiring from Congress in 2004. 
The deal raises serious questions as to whether Rep. Tauzin’s official actions were tainted by self-inter-
est. The Medicare prescription drug legislation contains key provisions beneficial to the drug industry.
It subsidizes private insurers to provide prescription drug coverage to seniors (thereby increasing demand
for drugs), bars the Medicare administrator from bargaining for lower drug prices, and effectively pro-
hibits the re-importation of lower-priced drugs from Canada – all key provisions sought by PhRMA.
Fellow Louisianan Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) followed Tauzin into the lucrative lobbying market.
Breaux, who had not been expected to retire from the Senate, surprised many by announcing that he
would be joining the lobbying firm of Patton Boggs at the end of 2004. In addition to the Patton
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Boggs work (for which Breaux is expect-
ed to receive $1 million a year), the for-
mer senator also will join a New York
investment fund and become senior
manager for a New York fund that han-
dles energy projects. These two com-
bined new salaries should put the 32-year
veteran of Congress in Tauzin’s income
bracket.
The Government-to-
Lobbyist Revolving Door Is
Spinning Out of Control
With more than a third of today’s retiring
Members of Congress (except those who
have retired due to death or conviction or
election to another office), and about half
of retiring senior-level officers of the exec-
utive branch moving directly from gov-
ernment service into lobbying on behalf
of private special interest groups, the
revolving door is spinning out of control.
The number of former government offi-
cials serving as private sector lobbyists dwarfs previous trends. 
Not only are the ranks of government employees-turned-lobbyists growing, but so are their salaries
and benefits. Those with insider knowledge and privileged access to government officials are increas-
ingly valuable to the business community attempting to secure added leverage over the course of pub-
lic policy. This degree of industry influence on the formulation of policies supposedly designed to
protect the common good is not good news for democracy.
Official actions in the name of the public good are often the casualty. Government officials tempted
by the prospects of future private sector employment may compromise the public policies upon which
they work. And post-government employees working as private sector lobbyists may abuse their insid-
er knowledge or privileged networks of colleagues built while given the trust of public service.
Without a doubt, today’s revolving door restrictions designed to protect the integrity of government
are not working. Our conclusion lays out some of the changes that are required to protect the integri-
ty of public policy from the special interests that benefit from the government-to-lobbyist revolving
door. Before that we take a look at the limitations of the existing regulatory framework. 
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Chapter 4:
The Existing System For
Implementing Lobbying Rules
and Revolving Door Policies
by CRAIG HOLMAN, Public Citizen
CURRENTLY, ETHICS LAWS AND REGULATIONS that address the problem of the revolving door are
implemented and enforced through a loose confederation of federal offices, each with different levels
of jurisdiction. The reason for this arrangement is that the federal ethics system has evolved both
through piecemeal legislation that applies throughout the government and through rules and proce-
dures that individual agencies and other parts of government have adopted on their own.117
For instance, ethical standards for the House of Representatives are implemented and enforced pri-
marily by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.118 Senate ethics standards fall under the
authority of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Ethics.119 Overall ethics guidelines for executive-
branch employees are developed by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), but that agency does
little in the way of implementation and enforcement, leaving that to individual agencies or even to
the individual officials covered by the rules.120 If legal action is deemed appropriate against violators
of the ethics laws and rules in either the legislative or executive branch, the cases are assumed by the
Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section.
The resulting hodgepodge makes it difficult for government officials to comply with the current reg-
ulatory regime and does not inspire confidence among the public that rigorous ethical standards are
being upheld. The conclusion of this paper offers a series of recommendations for fixing the system.
In order to put those proposals in context, this chapter describes some of the main problems with the
existing state of affairs. 
Implementation of the Lobbying Disclosure Act
Section 6 of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) reads: The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of
the Senate shall develop a “computerized systems designed to minimize the burden of filing and max-
imize public access to materials filed under this Act.”121 Yet those offices have so far failed to comply,
justifying their position by raising questionable arguments about ambiguities in the law or the
absence of necessary authority. 
Fortunately, Pam Gavin, Director of Public Records in the Secretary of the Senate’s office, has single-
handedly managed to work around the stonewalling to create a partial system for electronic dissem-
ination of lobbyist filings. Despite the absence of specific budgetary allocation, Gavin has devoted the
user fees collected for copying of paper records to pay for the posting of PDF (image) files of the lob-
byist reports on the Senate’s Web site at www.sopr.gov.122
However, these PDF postings lack most of the benefits of a full
electronic reporting system. They are not searchable or sortable by
bill number, issue area or any category for that matter, other than
a most rudimentary search by exact name of the lobbying entity as
filed. For example, a search for the lobbying records of the
“National Rifle Association” or “NRA” will produce no records at
all. The NRA has decided to file its lobbying records under the
name “Natl Rifle Association” and only a search for “Natl” will
produce the association’s records. Apart from abbreviations, if a
group misspells its own name in its lobbying filings, its records will
only show up on the Senate’s Web site under the misspelled name. 
The system does not tally information from different reports filed by the same lobbyist, making it
impossible to answer questions such as: “How much money has Microsoft spent on lobbying since
1996, and how has this money been divided between the firm and its outside lobbyists?” Nor is it
possible to download the data from the various reports into a spreadsheet so that one might do the
calculation manually. Instead, a user has to print out each report, enter the data and only then do the
calculations. In essence, the lobbying disclosure system on the Senate’s Web site is little more than an
old-fashioned card catalogue available on the Internet.123
The situation is even worse on the House side. The Clerk of the House has made no effort whatso-
ever to implement the disclosure requirement of Section 6 of the LDA. In fact, Jeff Trandahl, the
House Clerk, has even declined to discuss the matter when approached by Public Citizen.124
Just as importantly to the integrity, or lack thereof, of the LDA is the presumption by both the Clerk
of the House and the Secretary of the Senate that they have no enforcement authority to ensure com-
pliance with the Act. The Senate Office of Public Records and the House Legislative Resource Center
oversee the lobbying disclosure filings. The two offices may send “correction” letters to scofflaws who
have failed to follow the law. They can refer any violation that is not fixed within 60 days to the
Department of Justice, which can issue civil penalties up to $50,000. Until very recently, however,
there have been no referrals by the congressional offices to the Department of Justice for noncom-
pliance with the LDA, and the Department of Justice has not pursued a single LDA enforcement case
until this year. 125 Bowing to a FOIA request by a reporter, the Department of Justice has acknowl-
edged that it settled three enforcement cases, all in 2005.126 The number of enforcement cases may
grow as public pressure mounts for enforcement of the LDA.
48 A MATTER OF TRUST
The resulting hodgepodge
makes it difficult for
government officials to comply
with the current regulatory
regime and does not inspire
confidence among the public
that rigorous ethical standards
are being upheld. 
Essentially, compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act is voluntary, so there are many scofflaws.
In one study, the Center for Public Integrity found that 20 percent of lobbying disclosure records
were filed at least three months late; 3,000 reports were filed six months late and 1,700 reports were
at least a year overdue.127
Enforcement of Lobbying Ethics Rules
In addition to the disclosure requirements under the LDA, lobbyists are also subject to a loosely-knit
set of ethics laws and rules on their behavior. Many of these laws and regulations are discussed
throughout the chapters of this report and compiled in Appendix B. Monitoring and enforcement of
these laws and regulations covering conduct rather than disclosure rest with the ethics committees of
the House and the Senate for members of Congress, the Office of Government Ethics for the execu-
tive branch, and ultimately the Department of Justice.
House and Senate Ethics Committees
Each House of Congress has its own ethics committee charged with, among other things,
enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules and revolving door restrictions for their own members.
The Senate in 1964128 and the House in 1967129 established, for the first time, standing commit-
tees on ethics, designed to enforce conflict-of-interest rules, gift restrictions and codes of conduct
governing how members relate to lobbyists. 
In the House, the ethics committee is formally known as the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct. In the Senate, it is known as the Select Committee on Ethics. Both committees are
evenly divided between Republican and Democratic members. The ethics committees have the
authority to investigate alleged violations of ethics rules, issue reprimands or fines for violations,
recommend expulsion to the full House or Senate, and refer serious criminal violations to the
Department of Justice for prosecution.
By their very structure and composition, the congressional ethics committees are designed pri-
marily to provide advice and education about ethics rules rather than enforcement against viola-
tions. First of all, the committees are run exclusively by members of Congress and staffed by
congressional staffers. Secondly, committee membership is done at the pleasure of party leaders
in the House and the Senate. Finally, the ethics rules themselves are formulated by the congres-
sional leadership and ratified, sometimes without knowing what the proposed rules are, by the
majority members of Congress. 
Office of Government Ethics
The Office of Government Ethics was established by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. It
was created as an independent agency to monitor and enforce the new ethics laws for the execu-
tive branch and to promulgate implementing regulations. Even though OGE assumed steward-
ship over the ethics laws, the Act preserved a considerable level of independence among each
executive branch agency to create its own ethics code and to interpret and administer ethics laws
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for its employees.130 The Ethics in Government Act directed OGE
to review financial disclosure forms of presidential appointees,
provide ethics training to executive branch officials and oversee
the implementation of ethics rules by each agency. The Ethics Act
also required OGE to provide an advisory service and to publish
its opinions.131
As an ethics enforcement agency, OGE is better structured than
the congressional ethics committees in that most of its employees
are career public servants rather than political appointees. The
Director, however, is appointed by the president for a five-year
term. It currently has a staff of more than 80 employees. The
agency thus enjoys a certain level of professionalism and inde-
pendence from political operatives in the executive branch and
party leaders.
Nevertheless, OGE is far from an ideal agency. Perhaps its great-
est weakness is that it has been conceived as a “partner” with all
other executive branch agencies in developing, interpreting and
enforcing ethics laws and regulations. OGE is designed as an enti-
ty that provides guidance and advice to other executive branch
agencies rather as a monitor that routinely determines and imple-
ments ethics codes for the executive branch. OGE also does not
usually enforce the ethics code for other agencies, preferring
instead to give that authority to dozens of ethics officers appoint-
ed within each executive branch agency. And, as noted above, any
cases requiring prosecution are referred to the Justice
Department’s Public Integrity Section. 
For example, while OGE has developed guidelines for granting
waivers for employees from the conflict-of-interest laws governing
future employment, these are only guidelines. Each executive branch agency promulgates its own
waiver procedures, which are then interpreted and enforced by the specific ethics officer appoint-
ed within that executive office. As a result, there is no one set of procedures for seeking and receiv-
ing waivers from conflict-of-interest laws, and each set of waiver procedures is interpreted
differently by different offices. The resulting inconsistencies prompted the White House in 2004
to step in and issue an executive order requiring that all waivers be reviewed by the White House
counsel.132
Moreover, OGE has neglected to establish itself as an effective public information source. Though
the agency compiles and scrutinizes previous employment records for scores of executive branch
appointees and employees, it makes little effort to make these records available to the public. Such
information usually becomes available as part of public congressional hearings in high-profile
cases or through Freedom of Information Act requests. OGE also does not act as a clearinghouse
for waivers and other actions initiated in individual agencies.
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Finally, the attitude of “partnership” with the various executive branch offices on which OGE is
based has created a culture of “insider relations” with other executive branch offices. OGE tends
to view itself as an ally of the other executive offices whose purpose often is to do the bidding for
the executive branch. This culture can have profound consequences for the integrity of federal
ethics laws. For example, at the request of the White House and congressional leaders, OGE has
proposed radically scaling back personal financial disclosures for public officers, despite objec-
tions from several public interest groups.133
At the request of executive branch officials, OGE has also reclassified what constitutes an “office”
to narrow the application of the revolving door restriction. Instead of a former officer of HHS
being subject to the one-year cooling off period for lobbying HHS, that officer is now only pre-
cluded from lobbying the particular entity within HHS in which he or she had served.134
For the most part, the Office of Government Ethics appears to be serving the interests of execu-
tive branch officials, not the public and not the Ethics in Government Act. It has no interest in
centralizing records and disclosing information to the public, and the agency has developed a too-
cozy relationship with executive branch officials.
Ethics and Lobbying Laws Are Implemented and Enforced by a
Disparate Range of Offices in Both the Congressional and 
Executive Branches
Not only are ethics and lobbying laws and rules a loose patchwork of disparate and inconsistent reg-
ulations between and within the branches of government, but they are also very poorly enforced.
Congressional lobbying rules are implemented and enforced by at least four different agencies: the
Clerk of the House, the Secretary of the Senate, the House Ethics Committee and the Senate Ethics
Committee. Lobbying rules for executive branch officials, though overseen by a single agency, are in
fact interpreted, implemented and enforced by dozens of executive offices with little or no coordina-
tion and recordkeeping among them.
With no standardization and little public disclosure, regulating the conduct and disclosure of lobby-
ing activities—especially abuses of the revolving door between public service and private interests—
becomes a Herculean task. Violations of the law often are interpreted away or the rules are simply
changed to suit government officials. 
If we are to address the grave problems of the revolving door and other ethics issues, not only must
the laws and regulations be amended, but we must also change the mechanisms for implementation
and enforcement of these standards of law. These matters are taken up in the concluding chapter of
this paper. 
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Reducing
Revolving Door Conflicts of
Interest
How to better enforce existing rules and eliminate loopholes.
by SCOTT AMEY, Project On Government Oversight; CRAIG HOLMAN, 
Public Citizen; and PHILIP MATTERA, Corporate Research Project
THROUGH CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS, this report set out to illustrate the degree to which
revolving-door appointments throughout the federal government create the appearance of impropri-
ety and conflict of interest as well as actual ethical problems. 
The reforms required to root out this problem will not be easy to implement, given the influence of
wealthy corporations and trade associations that resist the disclosure and transparency requirements
that underpin all of the report’s recommendations. But public pressure, skillfully applied, could force
the executive and legislative branches of government to act for the common good by simplifying
ethics rules and increasing transparency through disclosure requirements. In this concluding chapter,
the report lays out a set of reforms to address the problem of the revolving door. 
The first of the proposals covers the revolving door problem in general, and the others address the
particular forms of the phenomenon described in the preceding chapters. 
Standardization of Revolving Door and Conflict-of-Interest Laws and
Regulations 
A lack of regulatory consistency across the federal government is a key reason for lax enforcement of
the conflict-of-interest laws and regulations that are already on the books. Ethics issues should be
overseen by a single independent agency that not only implements the laws passed by Congress but
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also enforces them diligently. For separation-of-power reasons, there would probably have to be dif-
ferent agencies for Congress and the executive branch, but each one should be: 
n staffed by career professionals;
n vested with the authority to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, conduct inves-
tigations, subpoena witnesses, and issue civil penalties for violations;
n provided reasonable independence from the immediate control of those whom they regulate;
and
n empowered as the central agency for implementation, monitoring, enforcement and public
disclosure of its charges.
The congressional entity should take over the responsibilities of the Senate and House ethics com-
mittees as well as the lobbying disclosure responsibilities of the Clerk of the House and the Secretary
of the Senate. It should be staffed and directed by career officials who are not Members of Congress.
The agency should also be afforded a budget that is approved once every two sessions of Congress in
order to better insulate the agency from congressional retaliation. 
At the executive level, the OGE should continue to serve as the principle agency overseeing the exec-
utive branch, but it should be strengthened in order to ensure that conflict-of-interest standards are
consistently applied. OGE must be granted some enforcement authority, particularly over civil vio-
lations, and should not be viewed as a “partner” sharing ethics responsibilities with other executive
branch agencies. It must be empowered as the central ethics agency for the entire executive branch,
responsible for the promulgation of rules and regulations, monitoring their implementation, and
enforcing compliance. It should also serve as the central repository for all rules and compliance
actions, and function as the executive branch’s public outreach clearinghouse for ethics. This would
also include the new rules proposed below. 
Several states provide models for implementation and enforcement of lobbying and ethics laws
through independent ethics agencies, selected on a non-partisan and rotating basis, with multiple-
year budget authorizations to protect against retaliations by a hostile legislature or governor. See
Appendix B for more details.
To summarize: The functions of the Congressional ethics committees and the offices
handling lobbyist disclosure should be combined in a single, independent agency cover-
ing the legislative branch. At the same time, the Office of Government Ethics should be
given greater oversight and enforcement responsibilities and should be responsible for
standardizing ethics procedures throughout the executive branch. 
Proposed Reforms Covering the Industry-to-Government Revolving Door
The appointment of corporate executives and industry lobbyists to policymaking posts in the feder-
al government poses two different issues. First, there are the individual conflict-of-interest consider-
ations. Such appointees may continue to have a financial interest in a former employer or may intend
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to return to that firm (or another company in the same industry) after leaving government service.
In either case, there is the risk that the appointee, once in office, will attempt to shape federal policy
in a way that benefits his or her specific former employer or that industry in general. 
Second, there is the broader question of whether the appointment of many individuals from the cor-
porate sector to key regulatory or contract oversight positions will give policy too much of a pro-busi-
ness tilt. This has been a growing problem in recent years, given the larger number of corporate
veterans appointed by the Bush Administration to important posts throughout the executive branch. 
As tempting as it may be to propose an outright ban on the appointment of corporate executives and
industry lobbyists to policymaking posts in regulatory agencies, we recognize that a blanket prohibi-
tion is not politically feasible. Also, it would prevent the appointment of desirable corporate candi-
dates, such as an executive who did a good job overseeing environmental remediation. Instead, we
propose to strengthen existing safeguards meant to prevent specific conflicts of interest. 
Employment eligibility standards
There are currently no government-wide restrictions on the appointment of corporate lobbyists or
executives to positions in which they might oversee contracts, regulations and other polices that sig-
nificantly affect the interests of a former employer. Existing federal rules focus instead on the obliga-
tions of such persons to divest themselves of investments that might create a financial conflict of
interest (or place such investments in a blind trust) and to refrain from participating in an official
capacity in any matter in which “any person whose interests are imputed to [them]” has a financial
interest that will be affected.134
In addition, there are rules saying that federal employees must avoid “an appearance of a loss of
impartiality in the performance of his official duties.” One of the situations in which such an appar-
ent loss of impartiality is said to be possible is the handling of a matter involving a person for whom
the federal employee served, within the last year, as “officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent,
attorney, consultant, contractor or employee.”
An appointee is supposed to deal with such situations mainly by recusing him- or herself from spe-
cific matters.136 That is suitable when the potential conflicts are an occasional matter, but it becomes
more problematic when an appointee must frequently handle matters involving a former employer—
which is more likely to happen, for example, when an executive is appointed to a policymaking post
in an agency that regulates the company where that official used to work. Repeated recusals (also
known as disqualifications) may address the conflict-of-interest issue, yet like repeated absenteeism
they can interfere with job performance. 
In theory, persons expected to frequently disqualify themselves from matters that come before the
government should not be considered as candidates in the first place, though the White House offi-
cials choosing the appointees do not appear to apply this standard. 
What is needed is a system of screening under which OGE would review the extent to which a pro-
posed appointee would likely face potential conflicts involving his or her private-sector activity. In
that screening process, OGE should have the power to block appointments of individuals—at least
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among those senior officials currently required to file financial disclosure reports—who would be
expected to engage in frequent recusals because of an apparent loss of impartiality related to a recent
(within two years) former employer. 
To summarize: OGE should review all senior-level appointees to determine whether a
prior position in the private sector would make that person ineligible because of the like-
lihood of frequent conflicts with the impartiality rule. 
Strengthening recusal requirements
An appointee who passes the pre-employment screening (by virtue of not having excessive possibili-
ties for conflicts involving prior employment) may still face some situations in which recusal will be
necessary. The current system for handling those recusals is too lax. It is left to the appointee (or his
or her immediate boss) to make a subjective determination as to whether the potential for a violation
of the impartiality rule exists. We recommend a stricter standard:
Recusal should be mandatory for all matters directly involving an appointee’s former
employers and clients during the 24-month period prior to taking office.
Recordkeeping for recusals also needs to be improved. Currently, in most cases, appointees need not
file a report of their recusals outside their own agency. We recommend that:
The employment histories and financial disclosure records of all political appointees and
Senior Executive Service employees, as well as any recusal reports or waivers, should be
filed with OGE and made publicly available on OGE’s web site. 
Finally, there is the question of enforcement of recusal agreements. Currently, OGE does not active-
ly enforce recusals, either itself or by referral to the Department of Justice. OGE should review the
agreements on a regular basis and should routinely refer instances of possible violation to the Justice
Department. 
Recusal agreements should be monitoring by OGE on a regular basis, and violations
should be referred to the Department of Justice. 
Ethics Certification
Adherence to the rules regarding recusals and related matters should be ongoing during an appointee’s
term of office.
All Senior Executive Service Employees should be required to certify each year that they
have read and are aware of conflict-of-interest and ethics restrictions appropriate to their
position and that they have not violated those restrictions with respect to their official
duties in the previous year. 
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Proposed Reforms Covering the Government-to-Industry Revolving Door
Government employees are often unaware of or are confused by post-government employment
restrictions. Both public trust in government and the private sector’s ability to effectively deal with
government officials would be enhanced by clearer standards concerning restrictions on post-govern-
ment employment. The rules should be more stringent as well.
First, senior officials should be held to a high standard to avoid the possibility that their decision-
making is influenced by future employment possibilities. For this reason, they should be barred for a
period of time for taking a job with companies that significantly benefit from policies formulated by
those officials. While it may be impractical to apply this to all companies (given the wide impact of
certain economic policies, for example), it can be enforced with regard to specific contractors.
There is also a need to close the loophole that allows officials to take a job with a company they had
authority over, as long as the post is with another part of the corporation. It is naïve to think that the
official’s inside knowledge and contacts will not somehow be exploited by the company. At the same
time, the widespread use of waivers, which undermine the limited restrictions that already exist, has
to be brought under control. 
We also recommend that officials leaving government be required to sign binding “exit plans” that
would remove any ambiguity about what they can and cannot do once they are back in the private
sector. 
In sum, the key recommendations are as follows:
n Prohibit, for a specified period of time, political appointees and Senior Executive Service
policymakers from being able to seek employment from contractors that may have sig-
nificantly benefited from the policies they formulated;
n Close the loophole in the current law that allows government employees to take a job with
a department or division of a corporation or contractor that is connected (financially or
through a corporate parent or other business relationship) to the division or department
of a business that they regulated or otherwise had authority over; and 
n Create a system to better regulate Members of Congress as well as their senior staff.
Currently, Members of Congress and senior staff are merely warned against impropri-
eties and advised to recuse themselves from issues of concern to prospective employers.
n Restrict the granting of waivers relating to the rules on negotiating post-government
employment to exceptional situations—and make those few waivers available to the pub-
lic in electronic form. 
n Require government officials to enter into a binding revolving-door exit plan that sets
forth the programs and projects from which the former employee is banned from work-
ing. Like financial disclosure statements, these reports should be filed with the Office of
Government Ethics and available to the public. 
56 A MATTER OF TRUST
n Require recently retired government officials and their new private sector employers to
file revolving-door reports attesting that the former government employee has complied
with his or her revolving door exit plan.
Proposed Reforms Covering the Government-to-Lobbyist Revolving Door
Currently, all former members of Congress, their senior staff and senior employees of the executive
branch are subject to a one-year cooling-off period during which they must refrain from making lob-
bying contacts. However, these same officials may immediately conduct all other lobbying activities
in most instances upon retirement from public service, including the research, preparation, strategiz-
ing and supervising of lobbying activities for a business, as long as the former public servant does not
actually pick up the phone and make contact with covered government officials. 
The cooling-off period needs to be longer, lasting at least a full two-year Congressional cycle. In addi-
tion, the scope of prohibited lobbying activities should be expanded. It is not enough to prohibit
direct lobbying contacts. Former officials should also be prohibited from planning and preparing lob-
bying strategies and supervising other lobbyists involved in attempting to influence legislation or
public policy among covered government officials. Nor should officials who leave government be free
to lobby another part of the federal government during that same cooling-off period.
Former Members of Congress presently retain special Congressional privileges, such as special access
to the floor of Congress and the Congressional gym. Such privileges not available to the general pub-
lic should be suspended for any former Member of Congress; at the very least, such privileges should
be suspended while the former Member serves as a lobbyist. 
To summarize: restrictions on lobbying by former Members of Congress and their staff should be
strengthened by: 
n extending the cooling-off period for at least one full Congressional session (two years);
n expanding the scope of prohibited activities to include the preparation, strategizing and
supervision of lobbying activity designed to facilitate making a lobbying contact; and
n revoking the special privileges given to former Members of Congress if they are serving
as lobbyists. 
Similar enhancements to revolving-door rules are needed for executive branch officials who become
lobbyists, including the extended cooling-off period and the widening of the scope of prohibited
activities. In addition, the executive-branch rules should create a special category of “procurement
lobbying” relating to efforts by businesses and special-interest groups to influence federal purchasing
decisions. Given that contracting is such an important function of the executive branch—and given
the strong potential for corruption in this area—it makes sense that this form of lobbying should be
highlighted for disclosure purposes. 
To summarize: restrictions on lobbying by former senior officials in the executive branch should be
strengthened by: 
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n extending the “cooling off” period for at least one full Congressional session (two years);
n expanding the scope of prohibited activities to include the preparation, strategizing and
supervision of lobbying activity designed to facilitate making a lobbying contact; and 
n creating a special category of “procurement lobbying,” which includes any attempt to
influence procurement decisions, subject to reporting and disclosure.
Increase transparency by establishing fully searchable, sortable
and downloadable internet databases for disclosure of lobbying
activity
This report strongly recommends that both existing and future ethics filings throughout the federal
government be made available to the public at no cost through internet-based, searchable, sortable
and downloadable on-line databases. The maintenance of such databases is key to establishing gov-
ernment accountability. As discussed in Chapter 4, the current Congressional system for disseminat-
ing lobbyist data is a case study in how not to handle public disclosure. 
The following is a compilation of the various datasets that should be included in a comprehensive
federal revolving-door database:
Existing data collection
n Lobbyist disclosure data submitted to the House and the Senate
n Financial disclosures made by those appointees required to file Standard Form 278
Proposed data collection
n Recusals/disqualifications filed by federal officials on matters involving former employers
n Annual ethics certifications by Senior Executive Service Employees
n Waivers granted to federal employees to negotiate future employment in the private sector
n Revolving-door exit plans for federal officials leaving government for the private sector
n Compliance reports on revolving-door regulations by former federal officials now in the pri-
vate sector and by their new employers. 
THE REVOLVING DOOR WORKING GROUP calls on lawmakers and federal officials to take immedi-
ate steps to implement this combination of reforms to address the three types of revolving-door con-
flicts of interest and to strengthen oversight and enforcement of ethics rules. While such measures will
require significant political courage, they will go a long way toward restoring public confidence in the
federal government. And as any politician knows, good government is essentially a matter of trust.
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Appendix A:
Federal Revolving Door 
& Ethics Restrictions
Source: SCOTT AMEY, Project On Government Oversight
STATUTES
5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 — THE HATCH ACT
Prohibits federal executive branch employees, including special government employees (i.e., advisory commit-
tee members) who are working on federal government business, from engaging in unauthorized political activ-
ity while on duty. Government employees in violation of the Hatch Act can be removed or suspended from
federal employment.
18 U.S.C. § 201 — BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND WITNESSES
Bans bribery of government officials and witnesses who appear before either House of Congress, or any agency,
commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 202 — DEFINITIONS
Defines “special Government employee,” “official responsibility,” “officer,” “employee,” “Member of
Congress,” “executive branch,” “judicial branch,” and “legislative branch.”
18 U.S.C. § 203 — COMPENSATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, OFFICERS, AND OTHERS IN
MATTERS AFFECTING THE GOVERNMENT
Prohibits federal employees, including special government employees from acting as a compensated represen-
tative for private entities before an agency or court of the executive or judicial branches of government.
Violations are subject to the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 216.
18 U.S.C. § 204 — PRACTICE IN UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS OR THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Provides that the penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 216 apply to a Member of Congress or Member of Congress Elect
who, practices in the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
18 U.S.C. § 205 — ACTIVITIES OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN CLAIMS AGAINST AND OTHER
MATTERS AFFECTING THE GOVERNMENT
Prohibits federal employees, including special government employees, from acting as a representative for pri-
vate entities before an agency or court of the executive or judicial branches of government other than in the
proper discharge of his or her official duties. Violations are subject to the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 216.
18 U.S.C. § 206 — EXEMPTION OF RETIRED OFFICERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES 
“Sections 203 and 205 of this title shall not apply to a retired officer of the uniformed services of the United
States while not on active duty and not otherwise an officer or employee of the United States, or to any per-
son specially excepted by Act of Congress.”
18 U.S.C. § 207 — RESTRICTIONS ON FORMER OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND ELECTED OFFICIALS
OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES
Provides a permanent, two-year, or one-year “cooling off” period from “representational activities” by former
Executive Branch officials, Members of Congress, senior Congressional staffers, and others.  Former govern-
ment officials are not limited in going to work for a private contractor, but are limited in the type of work they
can perform for them. Violations are subject to the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 216.
18 U.S.C. § 208 — ACTS AFFECTING A PERSONAL FINANCIAL INTEREST 
Generally, an executive branch or independent agency employee cannot participate in matters that affect
his/her financial interests, as well as the financial interests of his/her spouse, minor children, partnerships, any
organization in which he/she serves as an officer, director, trustee, or employee, or an entity that he/she is nego-
tiating or with which he/she has an arrangement concerning prospective employment. Violations are subject
to the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 216.
18 U.S.C. § 209 — SALARY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES PAYABLE ONLY BY
UNITED STATES
Prohibits government employees from receiving and anyone from supplementing salary, or any contribution
to or supplementation of salary, as compensation for his services as a government employee. Violations are sub-
ject to the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 216.
18 U.S.C. § 210 — OFFER TO PROCURE APPOINTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE
Bans offering anything of value in consideration for the use or promise of use of influence to procure
appointive office. Penalties include a fine, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 211 — ACCEPTANCE OR SOLICITATION TO OBTAIN APPOINTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE
Bars accepting anything of value to obtain public office for another. Penalties include a fine, imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 212 — OFFER OF LOAN OR GRATUITY TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTION EXAMINER
Disallows loans or gratuities paid to any examiner or assistant examiner who examines or has authority to
examine specified banks, branches, agencies, organizations, corporations, or institutions. Penalties include a
fine, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 213 — ACCEPTANCE OF LOAN OR GRATUITY BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTION EXAMINER
Forbids the acceptance of loans or gratuities offered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 212.  Penalties include a fine,
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
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18 U.S.C. § 214 — OFFER FOR PROCUREMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK LOAN AND DISCOUNT
OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
Prohibits offering or paying anything of value to receive certain bank loans. Penalties include a fine, impris-
oned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 215 — RECEIPT OF COMMISSIONS OR GIFTS FOR PROCURING LOANS
Bans persons from corruptly giving or soliciting anything of value for procuring loans. Penalties include up to
a $1 million fine, imprisoned not more than thirty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 216 — PENALTIES AND INJUNCTIONS
Provides the criminal and civil penalties for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, or 209.
18 U.S.C. § 218 — VOIDING TRANSACTIONS IN VIOLATION OF CHAPTER; RECOVERY BY THE
UNITED STATES
The government may void or rescind any transactions resulting in a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-225.
The government may also recover, in addition to any penalty prescribed by law or in a contract, the amount
expended, the thing transferred or delivered on its behalf, or the reasonable value thereof. 
18 U.S.C. § 219 — OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES ACTING AS AGENTS OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS
Bans federal employees from acting as an agent or lobbyist of a foreign principal required to register under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act or the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, unless certified by OMB.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 — DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (TRADE SECRETS ACT)
Criminalizes the disclosure of confidential information.
18 U.S.C. § 1913 — LOBBYING WITH APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Prohibits executive branch officials from using appropriated funds to directly or indirectly encourage or direct
any person or organization to lobby one or more Members of Congress on any legislation or appropriation.
See also P.L. 108-447, Div. F, Title V., § 503 (2005) (prohibiting the use of federal money for propaganda).
41 U.S.C. § 423 — RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSING AND OBTAINING CONTRACTOR BID OR PRO-
POSAL INFORMATION OR SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION
Also known as the Procurement Integrity Act (PIA), this statute regulates federal employees who are involved
in buying goods and services in excess of $100,000 as well as a federal employee contacts or is contacted by a
government contractor about post-government employment.
ADDITIONAL LAWS: 5 U.S.C. § 3110 Employment of relatives — restrictions; 5 U.S.C. § 3326
Appointments of retired members of the armed forces to positions in the Department of Defense; 5 U.S.C. §
4111 Acceptance of contributions, awards, and other payments; 5 U.S.C. § 7351 Gifts to superiors; 5 U.S.C.
§ 7353 Gifts to Federal employees; 10 U.S.C. § 1033 Participation in management of specified non-Federal
entities — authorized activities; 10 U.S.C. § 1060 Military service of retired members with newly democrat-
ic nations — consent of Congress; 10 U.S.C. § 1588 Authority to accept certain voluntary services; 10 U.S.C.
§ 1589 Participation in management of specified non-Federal entities — authorized activities; 10 U.S.C. §
10212 Gratuitous services of officers: authority to accept; 31 U.S.C. § 1342 Limitation on voluntary servic-
es; 31 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349 Use of government vehicles and adverse actions; 31 U.S.C. § 1348 Telephone
installation and charges; 31 U.S.C. § 1353 Acceptance of travel and related expenses from non-Federal
sources; 37 U.S.C. § 908 Employment of reserves and retired members by foreign governments.
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Regulations
(The following Parts include additional subparts and sections)
5 C.F.R. PART 2634 — Executive branch financial disclosure, qualified trusts, and certificates of divestiture
5 C.F.R. PART 2635 — Standards of ethical conduct for employees of the executive branch
5 C.F.R. PART 2636 — Limitations on outside earned income, employment and affiliations for certain non-
career employees
5 C.F.R. PART 2637 — Regulations concerning post employment conflict of interest (apply to employees
who left federal service before January 1, 1991)
5 C.F.R. PART 2638 — Office of Government Ethics and executive agency ethics program responsibilities
5 C.F.R. PART 2640 — Interpretation, exemptions and waiver guidance concerning 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Acts
affecting a personal financial interest)
5 C.F.R. PART 2641 — Post-employment conflict of interest restrictions
48 C.F.R. PART 3 — Federal Acquisition Regulation: Improper Business Practices and Personal Conflicts of
Interest 
Agency Supplemental Regulations
Department of the Treasury — 5 C.F.R. Part 3101
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation — 5 C.F.R. Part 3201
Department of Energy — 5 C.F.R. Part 3301
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 3401
Department of the Interior — 5 C.F.R. Part 3501
Department of Defense — 5 C.F.R. Part 3601; see also DoD 5500.7-R
Department of Justice — 5 C.F.R. Part 3801
Federal Communications Commission — 5 C.F.R. Parts 3901 & 3902
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation — 5 C.F.R. Part 4001
Farm Credit Administration — 5 C.F.R. Part 4101
Overseas Private Investment Corporation — C.F.R. Part 4301
Office of Personnel Management — 5 C.F.R. Part 4501
Interstate Commerce Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 5001
Commodity Futures Trading Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 5101
Department of Labor — 5 C.F.R. Part 5201
National Science Foundation — 5 C.F.R. Part 5301
Department of Health and Human Services — 5 C.F.R. Part 5501
Postal Rate Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 5601
Federal Trade Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 5701
Nuclear Regulatory Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 5801
Department of Transportation — 5 C.F.R. Part 6001
Export-Import Bank of the United States — 5 C.F.R. Part 6201
Department of Education — 5 C.F.R. Part 6301
Environmental Protection Agency — 5 C.F.R. Part 6401
National Endowment for the Arts — 5 C.F.R. Part 6501
National Endowment for the Humanities — 5 C.F.R. Part 6601
General Services Administration — 5 C.F.R. Part 6701
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — 5 C.F.R. Part 6801
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration — 5 C.F.R. Part 6901
United States Postal Service — 5 C.F.R. Part 7001
National Labor Relations Board — 5 C.F.R. Part 7101
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 7201
Inter-American Foundation — 5 C.F.R. Part 7301
Department of Housing and Urban Development — 5 C.F.R. Part 7501
National Archives and Records Administration — 5 C.F.R. Part 7601
Institute of Museum and Library Services — 5 C.F.R. Part 7701
Tennessee Valley Authority — 5 C.F.R. Part 7901
Consumer Product Safety Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 8101
Department of Agriculture — 5 C.F.R. Part 8301
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission — 5 C.F.R. Part 8401
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board — 5 C.F.R. Part 8601
Office of Management and Budget — 5 C.F.R. Part 8701
Executive Orders
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13184 OF DECEMBER 28, 2000 - REVOCATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12834
Signed by President Clinton therein revoking the commitments under E.O. 12834 placed on employees and
former employees.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12834 OF JANUARY 20, 1993 - ETHICS COMMITMENTS BY EXECUTIVE
BRANCH APPOINTEES
Signed by President Clinton and known as the “Senior Appointee Pledge.” This order extended the one-year
ban to five-years, prohibiting former employees from lobbying their former agencies after they left office.
Additional restrictions were placed on employees of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and trade
negotiators.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12731 OF OCTOBER 17, 1990 - PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR
GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Signed by President Bush ordering the restated many of the principles in E.O. 12674
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12674 OF APRIL 12, 1989 - PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR
GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Signed by President Bush to establish fair and exacting standards of ethical conduct for all executive branch
employees. This order established standard of ethical conduct, placed limitations on outside earned income,
granted authority to the Office of Government Ethics, and permitted agencies to supplement executive
branch-wide regulations of the Office of Government Ethics.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11222 OF MAY 8, 1965 - PRESCRIBING STANDARDS OF ETHICAL CONDUCT
FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Signed by President Johnson to restore citizens’ right to have complete confidence in the integrity of the fed-
eral government. Prohibited bribery, nepotism, using one’s office for private gain, conflicts of interest, misuse
of federal property, and provided restrictions for special government employees.
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Other White House Action
Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Policy on Section 208(b)(1) Waivers with Respect to Negotiations for Post-
Government Employment, Jan. 6, 2004.
Major Legislation
OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. 104-179, 110 STAT.
1566 (AUG. 6, 1996)
Amended the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, thereby modifying post-employment restrictions on certain
senior and very senior personnel the level of pay applicable with respect to certain senior personnel of the exec-
utive branch and independent agencies.
PUB. L. 104–106, DIV. D, TITLE XLIII, § 4304(B)(1), 110 STAT. 664 (FEB. 10, 1996)
Repealed 10 U.S.C. §§ 2397-2397c, which forced DoD to kept statistics of former civilian and military
employees hired by private contractors and thereby ending any transparency of DoD’s revolving door.
ETHICS REFORM ACT OF 1989, PUB. L. 101-194, 202, 103 STAT. 1716, AT 1724 (NOV. 30, 1989)
Amended the federal criminal code to revise provisions regarding former officers or employees of the execu-
tive branch or the District of Columbia attempting to influence the federal government or the District.
OGE RE-AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1988, PUB. L. 100-598, 102 STAT. 3031 (NOV. 3, 1988)
Amended the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to authorize appropriations for OGE for FY 1989 and the
five fiscal years thereafter, created OGE as an independent agency within the executive branch rather than
under the jurisdiction of OPM, among other procedural requirements.
ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978, PUB. L. 95-521, 92 STAT. 1824 (OCT. 26, 1978)
Established the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute violations of criminal laws by
high-level officials of the executive branch and specified presidential campaign officials. Created, within the
Department of Justice, an Office of Government Crimes to have jurisdiction over crimes committed by
Federal officials, lobbying, and conflict of interests.
PUB. L. 87-849, 76 STAT. 1119 (OCT. 23, 1962) 
Strengthened criminal laws related to bribery, corruption in government, and conflicts of interest.
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Appendix B:
Revolving Door Restrictions 
by State
Source: Craig Holman, Legislative Representative, Public Citizen
(February 2005)
Generally, a revolving door policy prohibits a former officeholder or government employee from lob-
bying the same agency or the same official actions for a reasonable cooling-off period after leaving
public office. Many states (21) have some form of revolving-door policy that restricts lobbying activ-
ity for one year or less. Nine states impose a two-year ban on lobbying by some or all of its officials.
A few states, such as California and New Mexico, impose a permanent ban for working on identical
official actions or contracts that the government officer was personally and substantially involved in
while in public service.
Some states (4) apply revolving door restrictions only to the legislative branch, some (4) apply the
restrictions only to the executive branch, but most (21) apply the restrictions to both branches of gov-
ernment. More than half the states (26 in all) also apply some form of revolving door restrictions to
senior-level government employees. Texas applies its revolving door policy only to executive directors
of agencies rather than elected officials. Another 20 states have no revolving door policy at all.
PROHIBITION APPLIES TO LEGISLATIVE OFFICEHOLDERS ONLY (4 STATES)
Alaska (1 year restriction) [§24-45-121(c)] 
Hawaii (1 year restriction) [§84-18]137
Kansas (1 year restriction) [§46-233(b)(c)]
Maryland (through next legislative session) [§15-504]
PROHIBITION APPLIES TO EXECUTIVE OFFICEHOLDERS ONLY (4 STATES)
Nevada (1 year restriction) [§281.236]
North Carolina (6 month restriction) [to be codified]
West Virginia (6 month restriction) [§6B-2-5]
Wisconsin (1 year restriction) [§19.45(8)(b)]
PROHIBITION APPLIES TO BOTH LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE OFFICEHOLDERS (21 STATES)
Alabama (2 year restriction) [§36-25-13]
Arizona (1 year restriction) [§38-504(a)(b)]
California (1 year restriction) [§87406]
Connecticut (1 year restriction) [§§2-16a, 1-84b]
Florida (2 year restriction) [§112.313(9)]
Iowa (2 year restriction) [§§68B.5A, 68B.7]
Kentucky (1 year for executive official, 2 years for legislator) [§§6.757, 11A.040]
Louisiana (2 year restriction) [§15:1121]
Massachusetts (1 year restriction) [§268A]138
Mississippi (1 year restriction) [§25-4-105]139
Missouri (1 year restriction) [§105.454(5)]
New Jersey (2 year restriction) [§§52:13d-17, 52:13d-17.2]140
New Mexico (1 year restriction) [§10-16-8]
New York (2 year restriction) [§73(8)(a)]
Ohio (1 year restriction) [§102.03(A)]141
Pennsylvania (1 year restriction) [§1103(g)] 
Rhode Island (1 year restriction) [§36-14-5]
South Carolina (1 year restriction) [§8-13-755]142
South Dakota (1 year restriction) [§2-12-8.2] 
Virginia (1 year restriction) [§2.2-3104]143
Washington (1 year restriction) [§42.50.090, 42.52.080]144
PROHIBITION ALSO APPLIES TO STAFF IN A DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY (26 STATES)
Alabama (2 year restriction) [§36-25-13]
Arizona (1 year restriction) [§38-504(a)(b)]
California (1 year restriction) [§87406]
Connecticut (1 year restriction) [§§2-16a, 1-84b]
Florida (2 year restriction) [§112.313(9)]
Hawaii (1 year restriction for legislative official only) [§84-18]
Iowa (2 year restriction) [§§68B.5A, 68B.7]
Kentucky (1 year restriction for executive official only) [§11A.040]
Louisiana (2 year restriction) [§15:1121]
Massachusetts (1 year restriction) [§268A]145
Mississippi (1 year restriction) [§25-4-105]146
Missouri (1 year restriction) [§105.454(5)]
Nevada (1 year restriction for executive official only) [§281.236]
New Jersey (2 year restriction) [§§52:13d-17, 52:13d-17.2]147
New Mexico (1 year restriction) [§10-16-8]
New York (2 year restriction) [§73(8)(a)]
Ohio (1 year restriction) [§102.03(A)]148
Pennsylvania (1 year restriction) [§1103(g)] 
Rhode Island (1 year restriction) [§36-14-5]
South Carolina (1 year restriction) [§8-13-755]149
South Dakota (1 year restriction) [§2-12-8.2] 
Texas (2 year restriction for executive directors only) [§572.051]
Virginia (1 year restriction) [§2.2-3104]150
Washington (1 year restriction) [§42.50.090, 42.52.080]151
West Virginia (6 month restriction for executive official only) [§6B-2-5]
Wisconsin (1 year restriction for executive official only) [§19.45(8)(b)]
NO REVOLVING DOOR POLICY (20 STATES)
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana,152 Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming.
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